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We are happy to announce good news for MA and PhD applicants who missed the March deadline. We are opening the 2nd round of admissions with a new deadline August 15.

Entry requirements are:
- BA or MA degree or equivalent
- Proficiency in spoken and written English
- Solid background in mathematics
- Previous education in economics is recommended

Your online application must content following documents:
- Curriculum vitae
- Statement of motivation
- Copies of your diplomas and transcripts
- Proof of English proficiency level
- Contact details for two (or max. three) referees

For more information please see sections: How to apply to MAER or How to apply to PhD
In case of any question, please do not hesitate to contact us at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.
or see the FAQ sections for MAER or Phd

May 16-17, 2024
CNB Congress Center, Plodinová burza, Senovážné náměstí 30, Prague 1

The Czech National Bank and CERGE-EI are organizing a conference on the topic of heterogeneous agent models in macroeconomics. Submitted papers cover (but are not limited to) the following areas:

• Distributional aspects of monetary policy
• Open-economy models with heterogeneous agents
• Firms heterogeneity, networks and macroeconomic dynamics
• Household heterogeneity in the high-inflation environment
• Interactions between fiscal and monetary policy in a heterogeneous-agent framework

Program

Keynote speakers

• Adrien Auclert (Stanford University and NBER)
• Jonathan Heathcote (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and CEPR)
• Vincent Sterk (University College London and CEPR).

Scientific committee

• Volha Audzei (Czech National Bank)
• Jan Brůha (Czech National Bank)
• Edouard Challe (EUI and PSE)
• Axelle Ferriere (PSE and CEPR)
• Xavier Ragot (Sciences Po and CEPR)
• Federica Romei (University of Oxford and CEPR)

Local organizers

• Volha Audzei (Czech National Bank)
• Jan Brůha (Czech National Bank)

Prof. Venkataraman Bhaskar

University of Texas at Austin, United States

Join online: https://call.lifesizecloud.com/21396233 (Passcode: 3687)

Authors: V Bhaskar, Maxwell B. Stinchcombe

Abstract: Refinements of Nash equilibrium hinge on the question: what inferences does a player draw about her opponent’s future behavior or his type at an information set that has zero prior probability under the equilibrium. We address this question by adding shocks to the payoffs of each player i at every terminal node w that are independent across players and across nodes, that have a sufficiently large support, and have a continuous distribution F^iw. A strategy profile s of the unperturbed game is:

• Purifiable if there exists some sequence of distributions F_n := (F_n^iw)i∈I, w∈W, converging weakly to the Dirac measures on 0, with a sequence of equilibria σ_n whose aggregates s_n converge to s.
• Strongly purifiable if for every sequence of distributions F_n , that converge weakly to the Dirac measures on 0, there exists a sequence of equilibria σn whose aggregates s_n converge to s.

First we consider finite games of perfect information with generic payoffs, with a unique backwards induction (BI) strategy profile. If each player moves at most once along any path, then the BI strategy profile is the unique purifiable profile and is strongly purifiable. However, if a player a player moves more than once along a path, as in the centipede game, then there exist purifiable Nash equilibria that are not subgame perfect. Moreover, the BI strategy profile is not purifiable for some sequences of payoff shocks. However, every purifiable profile induces the backwards induction outcome.

Next, we consider signaling games. In the beer-quiche game, both pooling equilibria (pooling on beer and pooling on quiche) are purifiable but not strongly purifiable. This leads us to investigate the implications of symmetric purifiability, where the payoff shocks of a player have the same distribution at every terminal node. We show that this selects the intuitive equilibrium (pooling on beer, which is symmetrically purifiable), since pooling on quiche is not symmetrically purifiable. We also show that purification cannot justify forward induction arguments, since equilibria that fail forward induction are strongly purifiable.

A traditional Beer Party for the CERGE-EI community will take place on Friday, May 17, from 6 PM at Kafárna na kus řeči, Vinohrady.

Looking forward to seeing you all there!