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Prof. Alp E. Atakan

Koç University, Turkey
Queen Mary University of London, United Kingdom

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Authors: Alp E. Atakan, Mehmet Ekmekci

Abstract: We study a common-value auction in which a large number of identical, indivisible object are sold to a large number of ex-ante identical bidders with unit demand. Bidders are initially uninformed but can acquire information from multiple sources that differ in accuracy and cost. We define a certain cost-accuracy ratio for each available source of information. The minimum value for this cost-accuracy ratio among all information sources determines the information content of the auction's price and information is aggregated if and only if the cost-accuracy ratio is equal to zero. In particular, the cost-accuracy ratio is equal to zero and information is aggregated if the set of experiments is rich, the cost of information is convex and satisfies a certain rho-monotonicity property.