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Maria Titova, Ph.D.

Vanderbilt University, United States

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Abstract: The large and growing applied Bayesian persuasion literature is sometimes criticized for assuming that the sender can commit to an experiment that reveals a signal based on the realized state of the world. This paper shows that if the sender's preferences are state-independent, the receiver is choosing between two actions, and the state space is sufficiently rich, then the sender reaches the full-commitment payoff in an equilibrium of the disclosure game with verifiable information. The latter setup is more natural in the applications to judicial systems, electoral campaigns, product advertising, financial disclosure, and job market signaling.

JEL Classification: D72, D82, D83, M37
Keywords: persuasion, value of commitment

Full Text: Persuasion with Verifiable Information