Political representation and armed conflict: evidence from local councils in Colombia

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Abstract

This study examines the impact of increasing political representation in legislatures on violence and armed conflict. By exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in the designated number of councillors in Colombian municipalities, I develop two sets of results. First, regression discontinuity estimates show that in larger municipal councils a considerably higher number of political parties have at least one elected representative. The estimates also reveal that parties with paramilitary links are the main beneficiaries of this greater openness. Second, regression discontinuity estimates show that conflict-related violence, primarily the killing of civilian non-combatants, is substantially lower in municipalities with larger councils. By exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in local election results, I show that the lower level of violence stems from a greater participation in local government by parties with paramilitary links. Using information about the types of violence employed by armed groups, the provision of local public goods, fiscal outcomes and coca cultivation, I argue that armed violence has decreased not because of power-sharing arrangements between the paramilitaries and the guerrillas, or because the paramilitaries are substituting rent extraction for violence, but rather because the guerrillas are deterred from initiating certain types of violence.

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1 Introduction

In this paper, I investigate empirically the impact of increasing political representation on violence and armed conflict. Two central goals of democratic political institutions are increasing political inclusion and dissuading political violence (see Powell 1982, p. 154; Dahl 2006, p. 9). Studying the conflict-related consequences of an increase in political representation may improve our understanding of how democracies can achieve these two goals simultaneously.

The study focuses on Colombia, a country with serious deficiencies in the capacity of the state to control violence, but which remains a democracy, at least if judged by standards such as regular and open elections. This makes Colombia an ideal laboratory for studying the relationship between increased political representation and conflict-related violence.

The study begins by isolating plausibly exogenous variation in the representation of political parties on Colombian local councils. To do this, I exploit arbitrary discontinuities in the designation of the number of councillors for a municipality. By law, the number of municipal councillors is based on a set of arbitrary population cutoffs, and so, under certain conditions, municipalities with a population just below a given threshold can serve as a reasonable counterfactual for municipalities with a population just above the threshold.[1]

Scholars have paid considerable attention to the size of councils, and of elected representative bodies in general,[2] and have associated this factor with the degree of openness of such bodies to the entry of political parties: the higher the number of representatives, the higher the probability that more groups in the population will be represented directly. Regression discontinuity (RD) estimates indicate that 1.2 more political parties are represented in municipal councils that elect 2 additional councillors (the number of councillors in the sample ranges from 11 to 17). The effect is large, given that the average number of parties per municipal council in the sample is 4.7. The results are robust to alternative specifications and samples. RD evidence also reveals that the effect is concentrated on third parties, defined as parties other than the two that have maintained the duopoly of power in Colombia for more than a century. These results, interesting in themselves, provide new evidence on the determinants of political inclusion.

The exogenous discontinuities in the designation of the number of councillors are then used to study violence and armed conflict. RD estimates show that the probability of a conflict-related homicide occurring in a given quarter-year is 4 to 7 percentage points lower in municipalities with larger councils. This is a large effect, since 14% of municipality-quarters in the sample experienced at least one conflict-related homicide during the period covered by the study.[3]

[1] See Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) for a pioneering example of a regression discontinuity design based on population thresholds; see Eggers *et al.* (2015) for a review of the literature using this type of design and a discussion of the potential pitfalls.

[2] See for instance Spinoza, (PT, chap. VIII); Rousseau, (SC, III); Madison, (Fed, 10 & 55); Brutus, (Letter No. 3); Buchanan and Tullock (1962, chap. 15) or Waldron (1999).

[3] Conflict-related homicide is defined as the intentional killing of civilian non-combatants, commonly

The decrease in conflict-related homicide is larger for selective killings (4 or fewer deaths per event), but almost nonexistent for massacres (execution of a large number of persons at the same time). Evidence using data from an alternative source shows a similar pattern for violent actions (of which conflict-related homicides are a subset): municipalities with larger councils are less likely to experience a violent action by an armed group in a given year. Importantly, these evidence also reveal which armed groups may be reducing conflict-related homicide the most: the guerrillas and the Colombian national army.

Several mechanisms could explain these results. One possible explanation is the increased presence of the Colombian armed forces: a larger council means more politicians and bureaucrats in the municipality, and in conflict-prone countries this could also mean that the national army provides more protection. Along with considering whether this hypothesis is consistent with the above results, I propose a test that uses the plausibly exogenous existence of a military base in the municipality as an indicator of the presence of the armed forces. I find no evidence that increased presence of the national army explains the lower level of conflict-related homicide.

I examine two other possible explanations based on the first main result of the paper, the close link between council size and the increased representation of political parties. The first explanation (power-sharing hypothesis) supposes greater participation by parties linked both to a guerrilla and to a paramilitary group. Their joint participation in local government may make peaceful interaction more attractive, and so both groups may have more incentive to refrain from open (and costly) conflict. This explanation is consistent with the literature relating power-sharing to armed conflict (Lijphart, 1977; Reynal-Querol, 2002a,b; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Francois *et al.*, 2015).

The second explanation (coercive capacity hypothesis) supposes that only one non-state armed group is represented on the municipal council. This group, benefiting from more political power and visibility, increases its coercive capacity. In this scenario, violence and armed conflict may decline for at least two reasons. First, this greater coercive capacity may dissuade its enemies (or those who collaborate with its enemies) from attempting selective killings. This argument is consistent with the literature on civilian victimization (Kalyvas, 2006) and on the effects of the balance of power on conflict (Powell, 1999). Second, greater coercive capacity may lengthen the time horizon of the group, encouraging them to replace violence by rent extraction. This explanation is consistent with the literature on stationary banditry (Olson, 1993; Bates *et al.*, 2002; Sanchez de la Sierra, 2015).

To examine the plausibility of these mechanisms, I first consider whether political parties that allegedly support the interests of the paramilitaries and the guerrillas have more direct representation on larger municipal councils. RD estimates show that, for a larger municipal council, the probability that a party with paramilitary links will have at least one seat increases by approximately 19%. Conversely, the estimates show no evidence of an effect on the political representation of left-wing and ex-guerrilla parties. Furthermore, the size of the municipal council has no impact on the probability that both

when an armed group enters a village and executes one or several pre-specified inhabitants.

a paramilitary-linked and a left-wing party are represented on the council.

I argue that these last results are not consistent with the power-sharing hypothesis. Rather, they provide support for the coercive capacity hypothesis, specifically the increased coercive capacity of the paramilitaries. In the rest of the paper I focus on this explanation and propose several additional exercises to support it.

In a first exercise, I look at whether the impact of council size on selective violence is affected by the degree to which a municipality had been contested militarily. In such municipalities, the increased political influence that the paramilitaries gain from a higher level of direct representation may shift the balance of power in their favor. As a result, conflict-related violence declines more in such areas. As a proxy for the degree to which a territory has been contested militarily, I use the number of massive forced displacements and of kidnappings. I find that the effect of a larger council is significantly higher in municipalities more exposed to such events.

In a second exercise, I argue that it is not coincidental that municipalities with higher participation by parties with paramilitary links experience fewer selective killings. To do this I examine outcomes from elections for mayor, who in Colombia are directly and independently elected by voters. The election of a mayor from a party with paramilitary links is likely to amplify the effect on selective violence of the presence of councillors with such links. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that in municipalities with mayors from paramilitary-linked parties, the reduction in selective killings is significantly higher, contrasting with municipalities with mayors from other parties, where the reduction is smaller and barely statistically significant.

Given endogeneity concerns about the mayor's party, I verify the robustness of the last exercise by limiting the sample to close mayoral elections involving a party with paramilitary links.[4] While municipalities where candidates with paramilitary links win and lose by wide margins are likely different, it is plausible that the outcomes of close elections are driven by idiosyncratic factors that do not themselves affect violence. The results confirm that the effect of council size on selective killings is caused by the increased representation of political parties linked to paramilitary groups. I argue that this provides strong evidence in favor of the coercion capacity hypothesis.

I conclude with an analysis of the possible incentives for paramilitaries to reduce direct violence. I consider two possibilities. The first possibility is that the paramilitaries replace violence with rent extraction through friendly means (for example, the capture of government revenue). RD estimates provide no evidence that a larger municipal council affects fiscal outcomes (public investment, current spending, transfers from the central government, royalties from natural resources or local taxes) or the provision of local public goods (public school enrollment, access to sewers and clean water, and the percentage of low-income citizens with health insurance). The second possibility is that the paramilitaries replace violence with larger profits from coca cultivation, a key source of funding for non-state armed actors in Colombia. I find no evidence that coca cultivation is more prevalent in municipalities with larger councils. For aerial spraying, used by the Colombian government to eradicate coca plantations, I find a negative but very weak effect.

[4]See Lee *et al.* (2004) and Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) for two pioneering examples of a regression discontinuity design that exploits close elections.

These results are consistent with the coercive capacity hypothesis, but only by deterring guerrillas from carrying out selective killings. However, given the challenges of empirically evaluating these phenomena, I remain cautious about definitively rejecting or accepting any of them.

This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First of all, it adds to the vast conflict literature (see Blattman and Miguel, 2010, for a review) by providing new and well-identified evidence about the effects of democratic institutions on violence and armed conflict. At the broad level of cross-country correlates, there is evidence that the level of inclusiveness of the political system can influence the probability of civil wars and political violence (see for instance Reynal-Querol, 2002a, 2005; Besley and Persson, 2011). A smaller set of studies has focused on subnational variation, studying the role of government policy, income or climate shocks on violence and armed conflict (see Dell, 2014; Dube and Vargas, 2013; Mitra and Ray, 2014; Harari and La Ferrara, 2013, respectively). To my knowledge no study has examined, at the subnational level, the impact of increased political representation on conflict-related violence.

My findings echo the logic of violence proposed by Kalyvas (2006): civil wars involve not just armed actors but also civilians, and the degree of control an armed group has over a territory is crucial in determining the intensity of violence directed toward inhabitants. I provide well-identified evidence in favor of one of Kalyvas's key predictions: the higher the level of control, the less likely the occurrence of selective violence.

Furthermore, my paper complements the literature on the determinants of the Colombian conflict by providing new evidence of the role of local representative institutions. Thus, the study adds to research that documents effects of income shocks on armed conflict (Dube and Vargas, 2013), a symbiotic relationship between the parties controlling the central state and paramilitaries exercising power in the peripheries of the country (Acemoglu *et al.*, 2013), and a negative correlation between political competition and murders of politicians in local elections (Sanchez and Palau, 2006).

The empirical evidence that I present comes from a single country, Colombia. Therefore, I use caution in making claims about external validity. Nonetheless, I believe that the political mechanisms and empirical evidence presented in this paper are useful in understanding the effects of increasing the degree of political openness of elected representative bodies. At the very least, the empirical evidence showing that larger local councils are more open to the entry of political parties can be generalized to other countries and other elected representative bodies. Although the conclusions about the impact of greater participation of parties with paramilitary links in local government and about the reduction of conflict-related violence may be specific to Colombia, other countries appear to have or could have similar experiences with non-state armed groups in politics.

The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides an brief overview of the Colombian armed conflict and the country's local institutions. The data and empirical strategy are discussed in Section 3. The main results are presented in Section 4. Possible mechanisms are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.

2 Background

Colombian armed conflict and violence

Colombia has suffered one of the world's longest-running internal conflicts, which dates back to the late 1950s. The conflict has its roots in struggles for land rights and ownership, political exclusion, and the weakness of institutions (Sanchez, 2001). Its persistence has been explained as the result of international influences and drug trafficking (Deas, 2015), and also the decentralization of local politics and public spending (Sanchez and Palau, 2006). The start of the conflict coincided with the founding of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which is currently Colombia's largest and best-equipped left-wing guerrilla group. Other armed groups have participated in Colombia's conflict, including other smaller left-wing insurgents and several right-wing paramilitary groups. Some authors have associated the origin of the paramilitary groups with local elites and drug cartels that faced threats of kidnapping and extortion from the guerrillas and felt betrayed by the central government for its favorable view of political competition, agrarian reforms and peace dialogues (Romero, 2005; Gutierrez and Baron, 2005; Lopez, 2010). In 1997 paramilitary factions formed a national coalition called the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC). Its creation considerably increased the effectiveness of the paramilitaries, and, as a result, the guerrilla groups were thrown out of large areas of the country. During this period of paramilitary expansion (1998 to 2002) violence associated with the conflict escalated dramatically. In 2002, with the arrival of a new president who eventually offered a de-facto amnesty to paramilitaries, the level of violence began to decline, and by the end of the 2000s, the severity of the conflict had decreased significantly.

Colombia's civilan population have routinely been the target of massacres, selective assassinations, kidnappings and forced displacement. The Historical Memory Group (*Grupo de Memoria Historica*, GMH), an independent group of academics created by the central government to record the history of the armed conflict, has estimated that the conflict has claimed at least 220,000 lives among civilians and combatants. Civilians account for about 81% of this number (GMH, 2013a, pp. 31-32). Civilians victims died in different forms. The GMH has classified civilian deaths in two main categories: intentional, killings in which an armed group enters a village and executes one or several pre-determined inhabitants, and unplanned, deaths that occurred as a result of another action.[5] During the period from 1981 to 2012 the GMH documented at least 26,380 intentional killings, affecting approximately 82% of Colombian municipalities all over the country (see Figure I). Intentional killings escalated at the end of the 1990s and peaked in 2000, as shown in Figure II. Although the information about the armed groups behind the killings is fragmentary, the GMH estimates that approximately 38% were committed by the paramilitaries, 17% by the guerrillas, and 10% by the Colombian military.[6]

[5]For a description of the criteria used in this classification, see Section 3.

[6]For the rest of killings, approximately 35%, a plausible author could not be identified.

Colombian local institutions

Colombia has a long democratic tradition with no legacy of dictatorship, unlike most other Latin American countries, which were led by dictators between the 1960s and the 1990s. The armed conflict has obviously damaged the nation's political institutions. However, even when violence peaked at the end of the 1990s, democratic institutions did not collapse. Regular and (at least on paper) open elections have been held in virtually all over the country for at least the last two decades. This is also true for representative institutions at the local level, on which I focus in this paper.

At the local level, the fundamental administrative unit is the municipality, of which there are 1,102 as of June 2015. Municipalities are governed by a mayor and a council elected by popular vote for a period of 4 years.[7] National laws that apply equally to all municipalities regulate elections and the duties of these elected officials. Municipal governments are responsible for providing certain public goods related to education, health, and infrastructure.[8]

A main function of the municipal council is to approve proposals brought forward by the mayor.[9] In practice, however, councils have a limited role in policymaking, with mayors being the key players.[10] Despite these limitations, the municipal council is a vital forum for the discussion of ideas and policies, and it provides crucial mechanisms for the interplay of significant political forces. One such mechanism is the *Cabildo abierto* (consultative public assembly), a public meeting of the council during which citizens can participate directly in the discussion of affairs of interest to the community.[11]

Councilors are elected using a multi-member single-district system.[12] According to the national electoral law the size of a municipal council is determined by population thresholds,[13] ranging from 5,000 to 1,000,000 inhabitants.[14] As shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table I, if a municipality's population is less than or equal to 5,000, the council must consist of 9 members; if the population is larger than 5,000 but less or equal to 10,000, the council size must be 11, etc. This same law prescribes that the population data used to determine the number of municipal counsellors is based on the central government's

[7] Mayors and councilors were initially elected for 2-year terms (from1988 to 1993). The terms subsequently increased to 3 years (from 1994 to 1997) and, in 2004, to 4 years.

[8] Approximately 60% of municipal revenue comes from transfers from the central government. The rest comes from tax revenue and royalties. Importantly, municipal budgets do not include expenditures for police or military services. However, according to the Colombian constitution, the mayor is the senior police official for the municipality.

[9] According to Article 313 of the Colombian Constitution, municipal councils have as main functions the regulation of the delivery of public services; the supervision of the contracts made by the mayor; the approval of local taxes and expenditures; the determination of the structure of the municipal administration, including salary scales, and the regulation of land use.

[10] As several commentators have argued, in Colombia mayors can easily have their projects approved, and this seems to be due to the possibility of ruling by decree (see Decree 111 of the Law of 1996; see also Transparencia por Colombia (2007), a report by the Transparency International Chapter in Colombia, and Gutierrez (2010)).

[11] See the Law 134 of 1994 .

[12] The seats are allocated using the D'Hondt formula, with a minimum threshold of 3%.

[13] See Article 22 of Law 136 of 1994.

[14] By 2012, the average population size of a Colombian municipality was 42,043.

administrative records. Each election year, two or three months before the elections, the National Department of Statistics sends the latest census data to electoral authorities, and these officials designate the number of members to be elected to each municipal council.

It is important to note that, to my knowledge, the population thresholds mentioned above are not used for any other policy purpose. The only mechanism that might use the thresholds as an input is categorization (*categorizacion*). Through this process, municipalities are divided into seven groups, mainly according to their freely disposable revenue (essentially, current revenue after excluding transfers and earmarked revenues). At the municipal level, categorization determines the salaries of the mayor, council members, and administrative staff; sets general administrative expenditures; and regulates entitlement to special transfers from central government. The law on categorization (Law 617 of 2000) specifies population thresholds that coincide with certain of those used to designate the size of municipal councils. However, according to Law 617, these thresholds are second-tier conditions, and so they are irrelevant in practice.[15] In Section 3 I check that this is indeed the case by showing that the municipality's category and also spending that correlates positively with municipal salaries and administrative expenditures vary smoothly around the population thresholds.

Political representative institutions and non-state armed actors

In the current armed conflict in Colombia, the relationship between non-state armed actors and representative institutions has progressed through different phases. The most recent -and most relevant for this paper- occurred during the 1990s and coincided with the creation of the AUC. This unification of paramilitary groups signaled an important change. An uncoordinated strategy of influencing politics by sponsoring specific local politicians from the two traditional parties was replaced by a strategic decision to influence politics directly and in a coordinated way at all levels of government (see Romero, 2005, pp. 245-246 and Lopez, 2010, p. 43). This strategy was manifest in a series of secret cooperation agreements between the AUC and a large number of politicians calling for the "refounding of the nation". Tellingly, these agreements implied the capture, cooptation or creation of third parties. These agreements came to light in 2006, when the recovered laptop of a paramilitary leader was found to contain details of the "para-political" connections. This discovery launched an investigation known as the *parapolitics*, which by 2012 had resulted in the prosecution of some 470 municipal mayors and councillors (of whom 130 have already been convicted), and the imprisonment of 40 congressmen (see Fiscalia General de la Nacion, 2012; Verdad Abierta, 2012).

The AUC strategy of capturing the political system contrasted with that of the FARC, which by the same time had also changed their approach: instead of sponsoring specific

[15]According to the paragraph 1 of Article 6, if a municipality falls into one category based on their population and a different category based on its freely disposable revenue, the municipality must be classified in the category corresponding to its revenue. Thus, for 100% of municipalities the category is based on freely disposable revenue. In fact, during the period studied, for approximately 60% of municipalities would fall into a different category differs from that predicted by the law if only population were taken into account. For these cases the population rule is explicitly violated; for the rest of the cases, it is not relevant.

candidates from a few left-wing parties, the FARC started a campaign to sabotage local elections. From their founding until 1997, the FARC supported and collaborated with a small number of political parties that they considered ideologically close. Initially, collaboration was limited to the Colombian Communist Party (see GMH, 2013b, pp. 90-95). In 1985 collaboration expanded to include the Patriotic Union (UP), a national leftist party founded by the FARC, and the Communist Party as part of a first attempt at peace negotiations with the Colombian government (see GMH, 2013b, pp. 157-162). As a consequence of a series of violent attacks on and assassinations of UP members, the FARC apparently changed their strategy and began a hostile campaign against elected representatives (see GMH, 2013b, pp. 257-267). The intensity of the hostilities against local government peaked at the end of the 1990s, and entailed not only promoting voter abstention (a strategy that had been used previously) but also actively obstructing the electoral process.[16] The high level of hostilities against local authorities during this period was accompanied by a series of mechanisms through which the FARC, although without a "proper" party, tried to coopt local political institutions (see GMH, 2013b, pp. 256-257). In the mid-2000s the FARC strategy apparently changed again, and the rebel group moderated its attacks on the electoral process, reverting to social mobilization and political campaigning (see GMH, 2013b, p. 275 and Avila and Velasco, 2012, p. 385)

3 Data and empirical strategy

3.1 Data

The analysis uses data on armed conflict, size of council size, and electoral outcomes in Colombian municipalities. The data on armed conflict come from two main sources. First, the Historical Memory Group (GMH), which, as previously mentioned, is an independent group of academics created by the Colombian central government to produce an historical account of the armed conflict.[17] In their final report, the GMH compiled a series of datasets that recorded the extent of violence during much of the conflict period (from the beginning of the 1980s until the beginning of the 2010s). Covering several types of conflict-related violence and focusing on civilian victims,[18] the data is based on reports from a network of Catholic priests and two Colombian NGO's, CINEP and the Comision Intercongregacional de Justicia y Paz. These reports describe incidents of political violence in nearly every municipality in the country (including those in remote regions). These Catholic organizations are regarded as neutral actors in the conflict, which minimizes concerns about potential over-reporting of violence perpetrated by one side or the other. In 1996 their data collection framework was revised to include internationally ac-

[16] During the 1997 local elections, for instance, more than 50 candidates were assassinated, and another 1900 were forced to withdraw after receiving death threat (see Rubio, 2002).

[17] Specifically, the GMH's mandate was to gather and recover all documentary material and information, including oral and written testimony, among other sources, on violations of Article 147 of the Law on Victims and Land Restitution.

[18] This data can be consulted at http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/informeGeneral/basesDatos.html

cepted definitions derived from human rights law and from international humanitarian law (IHL).[19]

The GMH classifies killings of civilians in two main categories. First, intentional killings, when, for example, an armed group enters a village and executes a pre-specified villager (or villagers) perceived to be sympathetic to the opposing side. Second, unplanned killings, when civilian deaths occur as a result of another action (such as the bombing of an infrastructure or military target). The GMH further delineates an intentional killing: the person(s) killed is in a state of helplessness, the perpetrator is an identified armed group or an identified group using weapons and uniforms of war (or used exclusively by the armed forces), and the victim is a social leader or an activist identified as a target by a non-state armed group. It is important to note that this category excludes deaths caused by mines and terrorist attacks, and also murders associated with the drug trade, those probably carried out for personal reasons, and those committed by vigilantes, social cleansing groups or gangs.[20]

The GMH adds an additional criterion to describe how selective the killing was. They establish a threshold of 3 victims: a killing event with 3 or fewer victims is labeled a selective assassination, and an event with 4 or more victims is a massacre.[21] Since the two types of events share key characteristics, in some specifications I combine them and label them selective killings. In other specifications, I distinguish between selective assassinations and massacres to shed more light on the mechanisms. Columns 1 to 3 of Table II presents descriptive statistics.

The GMH data provide a very complete account of conflict-related violence in Colombia. However, one drawback is that observations have not been systematically cross-checked against other sources. To mitigate concerns about the quality of GMH data, I also use data from the Conflict Analysis Resource Center (CERAC). CERAC is a private research organization that specializes in data-intensive studies of conflict and criminal violence. Like the GMH data, the CERAC data include information about violent episodes in almost all Colombian municipalities over a relatively long period of time (from 1988 to 2009). Importantly, these data also include information from the reports prepared by the network of Catholic priests mentioned above. However, the CERAC data also use media reports from several major newspapers, and events are cross-checked with several other official sources, including a dataset from the National Police and reports by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.[22] The CERAC data focus on attacks and clashes between groups, but also include information about unilateral actions such as incursions into villages during which civilians were intentionally killed; the bombing of pipelines, bridges, and other infrastructure targets; the destruction of police stations or military bases and ambushes of military convoys.[23] Columns 1 to 3 of Table II present descriptive statistics

[19]For more about this source, see CINEP (2008).

[20]For more about the exclusion criteria, see http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/informeGeneral/basesDatos.html.

[21]This definition of a massacre is also used by the Colombian National Police Department.

[22]For more information about the collection procedure, see Restrepo *et al.* (2004); see also Dube and Vargas (2013), who extensively use this dataset.

[23]Therefore, the events reported by the GHM should be a subset of the events reported in CERAC's database.

of some important types of incidents included in the CERAC dataset.

The data on electoral outcomes and the size of municipal councils come from the Colombian Electoral Agency. For council size, I have created a new dataset in which I integrate information from Electoral Agency resolutions and from Colombian Official Journals (*Diario Oficiales*). As previously mentioned, by law the municipal council size is determined by population thresholds. Population data used for this purpose are based on estimates calculated by the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE). These estimates are based on birth, mortality and immigration rates between censuses.[24] This centralized process minimizes the possibility of strategic manipulation of the data by the local government. Both the data on population size reported by the DANE, and the number of seats assigned to each municipality are reported in the resolutions. The relevant legislation was passed in 1994,[25] and so my analysis starts at that point and covers all local elections since then (i.e., the elections in 1997, 2000, 2003, 2007 and 2011).[26] Columns 1 and 2 of Table I summarize the mapping between population and council size; Columns 3 to 8 show the number of observations within intervals of 5%, 10% and 15% around each of the thresholds.

I merge the data from the GMH with the CERAC data, and also with electoral outcomes and population to create a dataset that spans the period from 1997 to 2010 and includes 4200 local elections. The sources of other variables used as controls and for the evaluation of sample balance are listed in the note to Table II.

3.2 Empirical strategy

I use a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to study the impact of council size on armed conflict and political representation. This design addresses the potential endogeneity between political institutions, representation and conflict. A regression discontinuity research design relies on the existence of a dichotomous treatment variable that is a deterministic function of a single continuous covariate. If individuals pass some threshold level of the variable, they are assigned to the treatment group; otherwise, they are assigned to the control group. A law that requires that the size of municipal councils be mapped to population creates an ideal situation for the use of RDD because council sizes increase deterministically and discontinuously at certain population thresholds. Thus, under certain conditions, municipalities with a population just below a given threshold can serve as a plausible counterfactual for municipalities with a population just above the threshold.

The baseline analysis estimates a regression model within a narrow window around a single discontinuity; that is, I pool all the thresholds together by normalizing population size according to the distance of each municipality from the threshold (above or below).[27]

[24] See DANE (2009) for a description of the procedure used to estimate population figures.

[25] See Article 22 of Law 136 of 1994.

[26] Since the data on conflict cease in 2011, I can not use the data regarding councils elected that year. Sources used: Official Journals 43.176, 44.056, 45.265, 46.639 and 48.128. (These journals can be consulted at http://www.imprenta.gov.co/portal/page/portal/IMPRENTA/Productos/Diario_Oficial) Electoral Agency Resolutions 2823 to 2852 of June 6, 1997.

[27] Intervals around each threshold are symmetric and constructed in such a way that no municipality appears in more than one interval. As illustrated by Table I, there are 6 thresholds with observations

Furthermore, I examine different bandwidths (the width of the "window" of observations used for the regression). In addition to the fixed effects of the thresholds, I include a full set of fixed effects based on the region and time (quarter, year and electoral period, according to the specification used). Additionally, I cluster the standard errors to account for any dependence over time within the municipalities.

As in the standard literature on RDD,[28] I consider the following model:

$$Y_{mt+1} = \alpha + \beta D_{mt} + f(\tilde{N}_{mt} \cdot \boldsymbol{\gamma}) + \delta_t + \zeta_T + \epsilon_{mt} \tag{1}$$

where Y_{mt+1} is the outcome of interest in municipality m in the term (quarter, year, or year in which the election is held) immediately following election t, $\tilde{N}_{mt}$ is the normalized population of municipality m in t,[29] D_{mt} is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the municipality has a bigger council size and 0 otherwise,[30] $f(\cdot)$ is a kth-order polynomial in $\tilde{N}_{mt}$,[31] δ_t is fixed effects by year, ζ_T threshold fixed effects, and ϵ_{mt} the error term clustered at the municipal level.

Identification requires that municipalities be unable to manipulate population estimates above (or below) a threshold. I check for such manipulation by running kernel local linear regressions of the density separately on both sides of the relevant thresholds (in the spirit of McCrary, 2008).[32] Figure III shows the McCrary test for each population threshold.[33] While Panels (a) and (b) show small jumps around the two smallest thresholds (5,000 and 10,000), Panels (c) to (f) show no discontinuities for municipalities with sufficiently large populations (20,000 to 250,000). A possible explanation for the small jumps at the two lowest thresholds (which are weakly statistically significant): population estimates are based on information reported by municipal officials (births and deaths) and so they could manipulate this data. The results shown in panel (a) and (b) reduce the trustworthiness of the estimations for these thresholds, especially considering that, for the entire (pooled) dataset, the McCrary test also exhibits an small jump around zero (see Panel (a) of Figure IV).[34] Thus, in a trade-off between accuracy and transparency,

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just above and below each threshold, corresponding to the following critical population sizes at which discrete changes in council size occur: 5,000, 10,000, 20,000, 50,000, 100,000 and 250,000.

[28] See Imbens and Lemieux (2008); Lee and Lemieux (2010); for RDD based on population thresholds see Pettersson-Lidbom (2012), Brollo *et al.* (2013), Hinnerich and Pettersson-Lidbom (2014) and Eggers *et al.* (2015).

[29] I define $\tilde{N}_{mt} = (N_{mt} - N_T)/N_T$ where N_{mt} is the population of municipality m in t and N_T is the closest population threshold T.

[30] D_{mt} is equal to 1 if $N_m > N_T$ and to zero if $N_m < N_T$, where N_m and N_T are defined in the footnote 29.

[31] As in standard literature, if $k = 2$, $f(\cdot)$ has the form:

$$P(\tilde{N}_{mt} * \boldsymbol{\gamma}) = \gamma_1 \tilde{N}_{mt} + \gamma_2 \tilde{N}_{mt}^2 + \gamma_3 \tilde{N}_{mt} * D_{mt} + \gamma_4 \tilde{N}_{mt}^2 * D_{mt}$$

Following Gelman and Imbens (2014), I focus on the local linear and quadratic regressions.

[32] For the population distribution, see Figure XIV in the appendix.

[33] These results use the bin size selection procedure suggested by McCrary (2008); however, they are robust to different bin sizes, including integers, which minimizes the concern of a bias (toward finding a jump) associated with the fact that the running variable is discrete (see Eggers *et al.*, 2015)

[34] No municipality has a population identical to a threshold value, which minimizes the concern of a bias toward finding a jump in population, as pointed out by Eggers *et al.* (2015).

I restrict the analysis to population thresholds between 20,000 to 250,000. The McCrary test for the new pooled sample confirms that there is no discontinuity in the density at the normalized threshold (see Panel (b) of Figure IV).[35]

Identification also requires that all relevant factors other than treatment vary smoothly at the population thresholds. To assess the plausibility of this assumption, Table II examines whether more than 50 pre-treatment characteristics are balanced across the normalized population threshold. Column (7) reports the coefficient for the size of municipal councils (D_{mt}) from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable, and for municipalities with a population spread of 5 percentage points or less. Column (8) reports the corresponding RD standard errors. In no case are the coefficients statistically different from zero. This evidence strongly suggests that municipalities with populations just below a given population threshold are a valid control group for municipalities with populations just above the threshold. To provide a more complete view of how pre-characteristics vary around the threshold, Tables XXVIII and XXIX in the appendix repeat this analysis limiting the sample to other bandwidths. These tables document qualitatively similar patterns.

Finally, identification requires that no other policies are based on a population discontinuity at the same thresholds. In Section 2, I argued that this was the case. I now provide evidence that municipal categorization, to my knowledge the only procedure for which there could be some doubt, does not apply. As previously mentioned, this examination is important because categorization regulates the salary of the mayor, council members, and administrative staff, among other items. Figure V maps municipal category against population estimates. Panel A displays a scatter plot of the municipal category in the first year of the term in office; the vertical lines represent the population thresholds. Panel B depicts the same association but with a scatter produced by averaging the municipal category over cells of 500 inhabitants. Additionally, a solid line plots predicts values from a regression of municipal category on a quadratic polynomial of population size, calculated separately in each interval between thresholds. It is noteworthy that no jump is visible: the results are identical to those obtained when using the municipal category for the year of the election or the preceding year.[36] Figure VI shows a similar result when instead of categorization I use current spending, a more direct proxy for the salaries of municipal councillors and administrative staff.[37]

[35] In Figure XV in the appendix I repeat this analysis for each year, finding no statistically significant discontinuity.

[36] In fact, municipal category changes in almost no municipality between the year of the election (or the one previous) and the year after the election. Note that in Table II I include this variable as one of the pre-treatment characteristics.

[37] Note that, as expected, current spending is increasing with population size; the small jump observed around the 50,000 threshold, besides not being statistically significant, and is in the direction opposite from that anticipated if current spending were determined by that threshold.

4 Main Results

4.1 Political representation

Panels (a)-(d) in Figure VII examine how the size of a municipal council affects the number of parties participating in local elections, voter turnout, and the number of political parties winning at least one seat.[38] Each black dot represents the average outcome in population spread bins of half of a percentage point. The solid line plots predicted values based on a RD model with a quadratic polynomial and no covariates, with separate population spread trends calculated on either side of the threshold. The dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. While panels (b) and (d) show no effect for turnout or for the number of parties participating in the election, panel (f) shows a different pattern: a larger municipal council increases by approximately 1.2 the number of parties with at least one seat on the council. Panels (a), (c) and (e) show no effect for the outcomes of the preceding election, which provides additional evidence that the RD sample is balanced.

Table III examines the results in Figure VII in more detail by reporting the estimates using Eq. (1). Columns (1)-(7) report estimates resulting from both a linear and quadratic form of the RD polynomial, over bandwidths (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) of 0.05, 0.10, 0.15 and the Imbens-Kalyanaraman bandwidth (see Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2011). Table III confirms the results in Figure VII. While showing no effect for voter turnout or participation of political parties, these estimates confirm that the number of parties with at least one seat in the council is significantly higher in municipalities with larger councils, increasing by between 0.590 (s.e. = 0.230) and 1.753 (s.e. = 0.694). The effect is large, given that the average number of political parties per council in the sample is approximately 4.7, and that the increase is more than a one-half of a standard deviation.

Results in Figure VII and Table III provide important evidence in favor of the hypothesis that a close relationship exists between council size and political representation. An additional result about the impact of bigger council size on the participation of different political parties is obtained if a particularity of the Colombian party system is taken into account: two political parties, the Colombian Liberal Party (left-wing) and the Colombian Conservative Party (right-wing) have dominated the political landscape for over a century. Although this situation has changed in the last two decades, Liberals and Conservatives continue to win a high percentage of elections at all levels of government. At the municipal level, Liberals sit on approximately 88% of councils and Conservatives on approximately 68%. No third party is represented on more than 22% of municipal councils.[39]

Figure VIII repeats the analysis in Panels (a)-(d) in Figure VII for third parties only. Results presented in panels (a) to (c) are consistent with those of panels (c) to (e) in Figure VII, but Panel (d) shows a positive and statistically significant impact of larger municipal councils. Table IV confirms the results in Figure VIII, showing that the number

[38] Information on turnout for the 1997 election is unavailable.

[39] The biggest third party was the party Cambio Radical, which for the period under consideration was represented on 22% of municipal councils.

of third parties with at least one seat is significantly larger in municipalities with a larger council, increasing by between 0.437 (s.e. = 0.218) and 1.594 (s.e. = 0.719). The effect for third parties is larger, given that the average number of third parties in each council in the sample is approximately 3.2. These results provide additional and strong evidence that in municipalities with larger councils more political parties have direct representation, and so participation in municipal councils by third parties increases.

Although part of the motivation for uncovering this relationship was its potential impact on armed conflict (the focus of the rest of the paper), these findings are interesting in and of themselves. The results are related to a phenomenon widely discussed in political science literature: that if the electoral system is more permissive, citizens (and political elites) see their vote as more valuable when directed toward their preferred small party (see Riker, 1982); given that districts with members elected by proportional representation are a good example of electoral permissibility, it is reasonable to expect that a higher number of political parties will be represented on larger municipal councils.[40] In Section 5, when I examine some mechanisms that could explain the results, I provide an possible explanation for this first result. This explanation is related to the specific type of third parties that exploit better this greater permissibility.

4.2 Conflict-related violence and armed conflict

Panels (a)-(d) in Figure IX show the probability that at least one selective killing event (either a selective assassination or a massacre) occurs in a given quarter of a year, along with the selective killing rate, both of which are plotted against normalized population. Panel (b) shows that a larger municipal council significantly decreases the average probability of a selective killing event. In contrast, Panel (d) shows that the rate of selective killing is not affected. Panels (a) and (c) indicate that this rate is similar during the preceding term of a municipal council whether the size of the succeeding council increases or not.[41]

Figures X and XI repeat the previous graphical analysis, distinguishing between selective assassinations and massacres, which differ in the number of people killed per event. Importantly, these results show that the presence of a larger municipal council has a significant impact on selective assassination but none on massacres. In addition, Panel (d) in Figure X shows that the selective assassination rate decreases by approximately 0.25 per 100,000 population (although this result is statistically significant only at the 10%

[40] The relation between the size of legislatures and the number of parties has been studied by Taagepera and Shugart (1993) and Taagepera (2007), who, for multi-member single district systems, introduce the following formula relating the size of the legislature, S, and the number of parties in the legislature, P:

$$P = S^{\frac{1}{2}}$$

Clearly, P is increasing in S, which is consistent with the findings in Figure VII and Table III. This relation is regarded in the political science literature as an example of the *Micromega rule*: the large prefer the small and the small prefer the large, or, large parties prefer small institutions in order to exclude others from competition, while small parties prefer large institutions that are able to include them within (see Colomer, 2007, p. 3).

[41] This provides additional evidence that the RD sample is balanced.

level). Figure XII adds an additional measure of fatal violence, the overall homicide rate (which includes all categories of killings). Both panels show the absence of a discontinuity at the population threshold, which suggests that the size of the municipal council affects only one specific type of conflict-related violence.

Table V reports the estimates resulting from Eq. (1) for the outcomes analyzed in Figures IX to XI. Panel A considers probabilities and Panel B rates. The estimates confirm that in municipalities with larger councils the probability of a selective killing or selective assassination event is significantly lower. RD estimates show that the probability of a conflict-related homicide during a given quarter is 4 to 7 percentage points lower in municipalities with a larger number of councillors. This is a large effect, given that in the sample a conflict-related homicide occurs in approximately 14% of the municipality-quarters. Although noisier, the estimates also show that the rate of selective assassination decreases by between 0.15 (s.e. = 0.10) and 0.54 (s.e. = 0.32) homicides per 100,000 population per annum during the council's term in office. In addition, Table V confirms that a larger council has no impact on massacres or the overall homicide rate. Tables VI and VII respectively show that these results remain using averages over each year and over the councils entire term of office.

Tables VIII and IX explore robustness using the Conflict Analysis Resource Center (CERAC) data. The CERAC data distinguishes between a violent action and a clash. Dummy variables are used to record such events by date, municipal location and, importantly, the groups involved.[42] The events of selective violence previously studied can be seen as a subset of the events reported by CERAC. Panel A considers violent actions, showing that municipalities with larger councils have a significantly lower probability of violent action by a guerrilla group or the Colombian national army. Interestingly, although the estimated effect on the actions by a paramilitary group is negative, it is not statistically significant. Panel B reveals that the probability of a clash involving the Colombian national army decreases in municipalities with larger councils, and for clashes between paramilitaries and guerrilla, the effect is also negative but only marginally significant.

5 Mechanisms

The results presented in the previous section can be explained in several ways. In this section I examine the three mechanisms I believe to be the most plausible: the presence of the national army, power-sharing and coercive capacity.

[42]For certain cases of selective assassination the GMH identifies a group that may carried out the killing. Unfortunately, these data are very fragmentary: the perpetrator is explicitly identified for only 9.8% of killing events, and in 35% of cases there is no information at all. Tables XXX to XXXII in the appendix present the results of a repetition of the analysis in Tables V to IX, but distinguishing between plausible perpetrators. I observe that the rate of selective killings tends to be lower, but that this effect tends to be strongest for events with an unidentified perpetrator.

5.1 Presence of the national army

The simplest potential explanation for the observed decrease in violence and armed violence presented in Section 4 is probably the increased presence of the Colombian national army. At first sight, the results in Tables VIII and IX, that incidents involving the Colombian national army were less frequent in municipalities with a larger council, can be interpreted as providing evidence against such an hypothesis. However, given the limitations of the data and methodology, I can not identify whether a decreased presence of the national army is a cause or a consequence of the reduction of violent actions by the other groups in conflict (in particular, the guerrillas). Thus, it is possible that the decreased presence of the national army is a consequence of a guerrilla group being less aggressive, or that in municipalities with a larger council more military forces are present but relatively inactive because fewer non-state armed groups are active in the area.

An ideal empirical evaluation of this hypothesis requires a direct measure of military presence. Unfortunately, such a measure is not available. However, I propose a method of evaluation that exploits a plausibly exogenous variation in the presence of the Colombian armed forces: the long-term presence of a military base. I assume that a military base serves as a proxy for a strong and long-established military presence in the municipality, and that the relative increase in military presence associated with a larger municipal council is smaller for municipalities with military bases. Therefore, if the hypothesis is true, it can be expected that the effect on conflict-related violence is stronger in municipalities without military bases. To carry out this first test, I introduced a dummy variable that equals 1 if the municipality has a military base. The data on the presence of military bases in municipalities come from Dube and Naidu (2015). Importantly, Dube and Naidu's data is limited to the long-standing military bases that precede period of my analysis, which precludes the possibility that the bases were constructed as an endogenous response to council size or conflict.[43] Dube and Naidu's dataset names 32 municipalities with military bases, approximately 5% of the municipalities with populations just above or just below the population thresholds used for assigning the number of council seats.[44]

Tables X, XI and XII present the results for the data, averaged quarterly, yearly, and over the council's term of office. The dependent variables are the probability and rate of selective assassination, presented in Panels A and B respectively. The specification includes the same terms as the baseline RD specification in Eq. (1), but also interacts D and the polynomial terms with the dummy for the presence of a military base. I observe that, in all the specifications, the interaction term is not statistically significant. This provides evidence against the hypothesis that a more substantial military presence is crucial to the lower level of conflict-related violence observed in municipalities with a larger council. Thus, although a larger council may imply a larger military presence, there is no evidence that this affects conflict-related violence. In the following subsections, I examine alternative explanations.[45]

[43]The military bases in Dube and Naidu's list are the larger ones. These bases also play an important role in how US military aid affects the Colombian armed conflict (see Dube and Naidu, 2015).

[44]Specifically, for bandwidths of 5%, 10% and 15%, the proportion of observations for which the dummy is equal to 1 are 3.96%, 4.95% and 5.90%, respectively.

[45]Even though the evidence from this subsection is not consistent with the military presence hypothesis,

5.2 Power-sharing

A more intuitive explanation for the results in Section 4 emphasizes the findings in Subsection 4.1: that in municipalities with a larger council a greater number of political parties have more chance of gaining direct representation. If the beneficiaries of this political openness are those parties with close links to non-state armed actors, i.e., if paramilitary and guerrilla groups directly or indirectly obtain a greater share of political representation in a municipality with a larger council, one consequence may be that peaceful interaction between these groups is more attractive, which may result in a decrease in violence and armed conflict because the relative costs of violence are higher.[46]

Evaluating the plausibility of this hypothesis requires uncovering whether the political parties that increase their direct representation in municipal councils are those that directly or indirectly represent the interests of the armed actors. In addition, the reduction in violence must be linked to the greater political representation of the armed actors. To examine whether this is the case, I study the impact of a larger municipal council on the participation and electoral success of certain political forces linked to armed conflict in Colombia.

I classify Colombian political parties based on the historical characteristics of the party system and also according to their connections to the armed conflict. A first category includes a number of parties with paramilitary links. To identify such parties, following Lopez (2010), I focus on those large enough to have representation in the Colombian Senate. As in Lopez (2010), I look at Senators involved in the "parapolitics" scandal described in Section 2. It is noteworthy that most of these Senators are the leaders of the parties they represent. Among the parties with at least one Senator connected to the paramilitaries (a link established by Colombia's justice system), I select those whose percentage is more that the 60%; Lopez describes these parties as 'born captured' by the paramilitaries (see Lopez, 2010, p. 51).[47] These parties with paramilitary links have

one must be cautious in rejecting it. An important limitation of this analysis is that it does not include the police: if a larger municipal council is not associated with a larger military presence, it may correlate to a larger police presence. One possible response is that since the start of the period under investigation (specifically, since approximately 1999, with the announcement of a major US military package in support of the Colombian armed forces) coordination among the armed services, in particular between the armed forces and the police, has improved greatly (see CSIS, 2009, p. 61). A part of the plan is that any increase in police presence should be preceded by an equivalent increase in military presence (see CSIS, 2009, p. 28). It has been argued that this better-coordinated strategy has played a crucial role in the substantial improvement in the overall effectiveness of the Colombian armed forces that occurred during this period (see CSIS, 2009, p. 63).

[46]This hypothesis is related to the literature that sees democracy as an potential institutionalized method of solving conflict (see Lijphart, 1977; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, 2005; Roeder and Rothchild, 2005; Reynal-Querol, 2002a,b).

[47]In the list I include those political parties represented in the Senate at any time during the period from 1996 to 2010, that were led by one of the Senators linked to the parapolitics scandal, but that disappeared or changed their name. Thus, I classify the following parties as having paramilltary links: Movimiento Colombia Viva, Partido Colombia Democratica, Partido Convergencia Ciudadana, Movimiento Alas-Equipo Colombia, Movimiento Apertura Liberal, Movimiento Convergencia Popular Civica, ALAS, Movimiento Equipo Colombia, Movimiento Nacional Progresista, Movimiento Popular Unido MPU, Movimiento Integracion Popular MIPOL, MORAL, Partido Colombia Siempre. For 2011,

direct representation in approximately 63% of municipal councils.

A second category includes the left-wing and ex-guerrilla parties. As mentioned in Section 2, only a few of such parties have been explicitly linked to guerrilla groups, and during some years the guerrilla carried out a hostile campaign against elected officials. However, it is reasonable to expect that threats and violence targeted elected officials who were more ideologically distant, and that the FARC may have expected less resistance, maybe even collaboration or direct representation, from elected officials who were ideologically close.[48] Left-wing parties are represented on approximately 25% of municipal councils.

Finally, the third and fourth categories consist of the Liberal and Conservative parties respectively, the oldest and still most important political parties in Colombia at all levels of government. As mentioned in Section 4, in the sample under consideration Liberals have direct representation on approximately 88% of municipal councils, and Conservatives have at least one seat on 68% of councils.

Table XIII shows the results for participation and success of paramilitary-linked, left-wing, Liberal and Conservative parties. Panel A considers the probability that at least one party within each category participates in a given municipal council election. I observe no statistically significant effect. Panel B considers the probability of at least one party within each group winning at least one seat on the municipal council. Interestingly and importantly, I observe a significant increase in the probability that a party with paramilitary links wins at least one seat; this effect is robust to all of the specifications.[49]

This last result is consistent with the power-sharing hypothesis. However, increased direct representation of paramilitary groups does not necessarily make peaceful interaction between the paramilitaries and the guerrilla more likely. A key element of the power-sharing hypothesis remains to be tested: more political representation for paramilitaries is key, but it is crucial that the guerrillas also have more voice. Panel B in Table XIII also examines this issue. Importantly, minority parties that may be close to guerrilla groups (those that I classify as left-wing or ex-guerrilla) do not increase their representation when

I include the movement Afrovides, and also Movimiento de Inclusion y oportunidades, which is the same as the Movimiento Popular Unido MPU.

[48] On the relation between the legal political forces and the most important guerrilla group, the FARC, see Section 2. For the identification of left-wing political parties, I followed Hoyos (2007). The ex-guerrilla parties are those that were created as a result of a demobilization or peace process between small guerrilla groups and the Colombian government. Given that these parties are represented on only 0.22% of municipal councils, there is insufficient variation to consider this category separately. I have classified the following parties as left-wing or ex-guerrilla: Polo democratico alternativo, Movimiento MOIR, Union Patriotica UP, Partido Polo democratico Independiente, Partido Comunista Colombiano, Movimiento Frente Social y poltico, Alianza Democratica M19, Movimiento 19 de abril, Alianza Nacional Popular ANAPO, Partido del Socialismo Democratico, Movimiento Poltico Comunal y Comunitario de Colombia.

[49] Parties with parliamentary links had more direct participation in larger municipal councils both in terms of the probability of winning at least one seat and the percentage of seats won (See Panel B in Table XXXIII in the appendix). An additional and related question is whether the increased representation of minority parties is a consequence of a disproportionality in the electoral system (rather than just the number of councillors). Panel A in Table XXXIII presents an analysis of vote share that yields the same results, which refutes this possibility.

the municipal council is larger. Furthermore, the same panel shows that there is no effect on the probability that both a party with paramilitary links and a left-wing party have at least one seat in the same council.

Although important, the results in this subsection suggest that there is insufficient evidence to support the power-sharing hypothesis. However, given the challenges in empirically evaluating the involvement in politics of the armed actors (in particular, the guerrillas), one must be cautious in rejecting this hypothesis. However, in the following subsection I examine a third explanation that not only is consistent with the information presented in this section but is supported by additional empirical and anecdotal evidence.

5.3 Coercive capacity

The finding that larger municipal councils lead to increased representation only for parties with paramilitary links suggests a third possible explanation for the impact of council size on conflict-related violence. This explanation is based on the idea that when politicians with paramilitary links enjoy greater influence, the coercive capacity of paramilitaries rises. In such a scenario, the guerrillas may have more difficulty carrying out selective killings. Furthermore, paramilitaries, with less need for retaliation, may have an incentive to replace violence with rent extraction.

An extensive literature has documented the increased coercive capacity of Colombian paramilitaries stemming from the cooptation of politicians and political parties. There is now a consensus among scholars who study the Colombian conflict that a key objective of paramilitaries, at least since their unification in 1997, has been the capture of local institutions and the imposition of a new social order. To attain this objective, it was crucial to win local officials to their cause through cooptation, threats or a combination of the two (see, for example, Romero, 2005; Gutierrez and Baron, 2005; Valencia, 2007; Garay *et al.*, 2008; Avila, 2010; Acemoglu *et al.*, 2013; Gafaro *et al.*, 2014). For instance, Acemoglu *et al.* (2013) show that when a Senator receives a greater proportion of votes in areas with a high paramilitary presence, the Senator is more likely to be arrested subsequently for illegal connections with paramilitaries and to have supported legislation viewed as lenient towards such organizations. According to Gafaro *et al.* (2014), the presence of armed groups in Colombian municipalities is associated with increases in participation in political organizations. These authors argue that this increase is not driven by communities organizing themselves to resist or counteract the influence of non-state armed actors but by the capture of these organizations by these actors, who then create networks that impose stronger control over the population.

Among the qualitative evidence gathered by the GMH it is common to find testimonies showing that in municipalities governed by politicians with paramilitary links, the coercive capacity of these armed groups is expressed through the absence of denunciations. The following are two examples:

> We did not denounce it [some irregularities associated with the presence in power of politicians linked to paramilitaries] because, on the one hand, there were pressures; on the other hand, we were afraid to do it ... We have been

> told: "Hey, why you did not denounce it" But we never seriously considered that ... Look, in these regions ... you have to be quiet, because if you start talking or something ... You have to pay ... we regret all these things and that is very hard, but in these mining towns everything is forgotten (see GMH, 2013a, p. 350)

> You are calm at home, they [the paramilitaries] arrive and kill your family, they take them and torture them, you do not know where are they, and do not you do not know anything anymore. What will you do? You go to the police, which is supposed to ensure public order. You get there and they tell you: "Look, shut your mouth, because otherwise they will also take you" (see GMH, 2008, p. 92)

Through which specific channels can the greater paramilitary coercive capacity cause a reduction in conflict-related violence? As previously mentioned, at least two explanations exist. First, higher paramilitary coercive capacity may raise the cost of selective killing for the guerrillas. This may result in an equilibrium with less conflict-related violence by both groups, but with a plausibly greater reduction in violent actions carried out by the guerrillas. The absence of denunciations for fear of reprisal documented above, along with Gafaro *et al.*'s conclusions about paramilitary networks, suggest a possible mechanism for this reduction: in areas controlled by paramilitary groups, collaboration with the guerrillas (in particular, passing information about specific targets) is riskier.[50] Second, increased paramilitary influence may imply more instruments to impose order and organize violence. As some literature on stationary banditry have shown (see Olson, 1993; Bates *et al.*, 2002; Sanchez de la Sierra, 2015), this process may increase the time horizon of paramilitaries and given them incentives to replace violence with rent extraction.

An ideal empirical evaluation of the coercive capacity hypothesis requires a direct measure of paramilitary coercive power. Unfortunately, such a measure does not exist. Therefore, in addition to examining whether this hypothesis is consistent with the evidence from previous sections, I conduct several exercises to test certain key implications. Given the limitations of the available data, I can not draw definitive conclusions about the specific mechanism that could explain the results. However, I argue in favor of the plausibility of the coercive capacity hypothesis and suggest that for certain channels, the evidence seems to go in the opposite direction.

I start by re-examining the results on the impact of municipal council size on armed conflict (Tables VIII and IX). As discussed in Section 4, Panel A in both tables shows that a larger council causes a reduction in violent actions by the guerrillas and the Colombian army. The coefficient for the impact on actions by paramilitaries is also negative, but is only marginally statistically significant. One explanation for this result is the increased cost of carrying out selective violence for the guerrillas caused by the greater capacity for deterrence available to paramilitary groups: thus, for the guerrillas the cost of a violent action is plausibly higher, while for the paramilitaries, both costs and benefits may be

[50] This mechanism is consistent with that proposed in Kalyvas 2006, capt. 6. For alternative theories, see Azam (2002, 2006)

lower, mainly because certain potential targets seemed less threatening. Panel A also documents a decreased presence on the part of the Colombian army. Tighter paramilitary control of territory could explain this result: given that the army has a strong preference for battling the guerrillas, if these groups decrease the intensity of their actions, the Colombian army will potentially disengage from areas controlled by paramilitary groups.[51]

The coercive capacity hypothesis may also help to explain an additional result in Section 4, that the impact of a larger municipal council on selective violence is marginal for less selective killings (massacres). Insofar as the main objective of a massacre is to severely punish and to deter civilian collaboration with the enemy (see GMH, 2013a), it is reasonable to expect that the incentives for incumbents and insurgents to use this strategy go in opposite directions.[52] Since the coercive capacity hypothesis conceptualizes the paramilitaries as incumbents, it can be expected that the net impact of a larger council on massacres is null.[53]

To shed further light on the plausibility of the paramilitary coercive capacity hypothesis, I now conduct several additional exercises based on certain key consequences. A first exercise consists of examining whether the impact of a larger municipal council on selective violence is affected by the degree to which the territory was contested militarily in the past. I hypothesize that the effect of an exogenous increase in the power of politicians with paramilitary links (as a consequence of a larger municipal council) on selective killings is amplified when it is produced in areas that have been more contested, the reason being that the greater visibility and power of politicians with paramilitary links is decisive in determining the final victor.[54]

To empirically assess the plausibility of this hypothesis I used different proxies for the degree to which municipalities have been contested in the past. First, I use the occurrence of events of massive forced displacement. By 2005, forced displacement had affected approximately 7% of the Colombian population. All armed groups have deliberately triggered the forced migration of civilians, which has augmented their resources and hampered the fighting capacity of the enemy (see Ibanez and Velez, 2008). Paramilitary groups instigated half of all forced migrations, while guerrilla groups and the simultane-

[51] See HRW (2000); Romero (2005); Valencia (2007) for anecdotal evidence showing that this has been a common phenomenon during the Colombian conflict.

[52] See Kalyvas (1999, 2006) for a possible logic for this kind of killing.

[53] An additional argument in support of this reasoning can be found by considering the negative sign of the coefficient expressing the impact of a larger council on massacres: since paramilitaries are allegedly responsible for the largest percentage of massacres, and since as incumbents they have fewer incentives to massively punish civilian collaboration with guerrilla groups, a negative effect that is weakly significant could be anticipated.

[54] For very contested areas, the presence in the councils of politicians with paramilitary links seems to have played a decisive role in the creation of an anti-guerrilla coalition among local elites, as recognized by a paramilitary leader who described how the control of a very contested municipality was consolidated:

> One of the objectives was the political and military control of Barrancabermeja ... The golden entry-point was the [local] council. The council was our first ally ... The first thing I tell councilors is that they have to build a coalition, and show me that the several factions in which the council was divided were willing to act as a single player" Ernesto Baez (Vaguardia Liberal, 2012)

ous presence of two armed groups were responsible for 20% and 22% of such migrations, respectively (see Ibanez and Velez, 2008). I construct a dummy variable that equals 1 if the municipality has experienced a massive forced migration event in a given year.[55] To reduce concerns that displacement is an endogenous response to council size or conflict, I compute the average of those years for which data exist. By 2008 approximately 34% of municipalities had experienced at least one massive forced migration event. Panel A in Tables XIV to XVI presents the results of a RD specification that includes interactions with the measure of the municipality's previous exposure to forced migration. The dependent variable is the probability of selective killing. I observe that the interaction term is negative and statistically significant for almost all specifications,[56] which provides evidence in favor of the coercive capacity hypothesis.

As a second proxy for municipalities that have been contested militarily I use the rate of kidnapping, a particularly often-used tool in Colombia's conflict. approximately 27.023 conflict-related kidnappings occurred between 1970 and 2010, most carried out by guerrilla groups (see GMH, 2013a, p. 64). I also construct a dummy variable that equals 1 if the municipality has experienced a conflict-related kidnapping, and calculate the average for the years for which data exists.[57] By 2008 approximately 88% of municipalities had experienced at least one event of conflict-related kidnapping. Panel B in Tables XIV to XVI shows that for this second proxy, the interaction term is also negative and statistically significant in almost all specifications.[58]

Although these last results are consistent with the paramilitary coercive capacity hypothesis, they provide only indirect evidence of a causal relationship between political representation with paramilitary links and a lower prevalence of conflict-related killing. Now I show that it is not coincidental that larger municipal councils are associated with both more parties with paramilitary links and fewer selective killings. Given that the increased representation of political parties linked to paramilitaries is clearly an outcome

[55]The data come from the Center of Studies on Economic Development, which compiled and processed information provided by the Presidential Agency for Social Action. Data are available for the period 1997-2009 and can be accessed at https://economia.uniandes.edu.co/component/booklibrary/478/view/46/Documentos%20CEDE/881/panel-municipal-del-cede.

[56]The only specification for which the interaction term is not negative is one in which I use a lineal polynomial and a relatively large bandwidth. Concerns about this not-robustness result may be alleviated if, as suggested by Lee and Lemieux, 2010, I focus on higher order polynomials for larger bandwidths.

[57]The source for the data on conflict-related kidnapping is the GMH, described above. The GMH excludes kidnappings associated with rape, custody disputes, robbery, human trafficking, forced disappearance or recruitment, and those that last less than 24 hours (unless there are part of a rescue, escape or negotiation process).

[58]I also examine the impact of the measures for selective killings used in Section 4. Panel A in Tables XXXIV to XXXV shows the results. The interaction term is negative and statistically significant for all specifications. Additionally, I evaluate the effect of the past presence of guerrilla and paramilitaries, focusing on municipalities that experienced (i) violent actions by both guerrilla and paramilitaries and (ii) violent actions by either paramilitaries or guerrillas. Panel B in Tables XXXIV to XXXV shows the results: while the interaction term is negative and statistically significant for municipalities with a higher proportion of violent actions by both groups, there is no effect for those municipalities with a higher proportion of unilateral actions by one group. Since we expect that municipalities where both guerrilla and paramilitaries initiate violent actions are more contested, this result is also consistent with the paramilitary coercive capacity hypothesis.

of council size, it is not possible to directly look at its impact on selective killings.[59] As an alternative, I explore paramilitary political representation in mayoral elections. Although the outcomes of mayoral elections are plausibly related to those for a municipal council, mayors are directly and independently elected, which alleviates concerns about its direct dependence on the size of the council.[60] Moreover, results exploiting variation from close mayoral elections exhibit a similar pattern.

How can studying electoral outcomes in mayoral elections shed further light on the plausibility of the coercive capacity hypothesis? I suggest that a mayor connected with a paramilitary party reinforces the effect of councillors with paramilitary links on selective violence. Panel A in Table XVII presents a first specification that includes the same terms as the baseline RD specification in Eq. (1), but now also interacts D and the polynomial terms with a dummy for a mayor from a party with links to a paramilitary group. The dependent variable is the probability of a selective killing event during a quarter-year. Importantly, I observe that the interaction term is negative and statistically significant for the key specifications,[61] providing evidence that supports the hypothesis that the lower rate of conflict-related violence observed in municipalities with larger councils crucially depends on paramilitaries having more direct political representation. Panel B in Table XVII replaces the dummy for a mayor with paramilitary links with one for a mayor from a left-wing or ex-guerrilla party. I observe that the interaction term is not statistically significant for any specification, providing further evidence in support of the coercive capacity hypothesis. Tables XVIII and XIX examine robustness for yearly and term-of-office averages.

Since endogeneity concerns about the mayor's party dummy may remain, I examine robustness by looking at close mayoral elections. Thus, in addition to municipalities with populations just above or below the population thresholds, I further restrict the sample to mayoral elections where either the first- or second-place candidate is from a party with paramilitary links. I compare municipalities in which a candidate from a paramilitary-linked party just barely defeats one from a party unconnected to a paramilitary group to municipalities where a candidate from a paramilitary-linked party loses a close election. If the final vote share includes a continuous density, then the results of a closely contested mayoral election can be taken as random.

I define a new dummy that takes on a value of 1 if a candidate from a party with paramilitary links wins a close mayoral race (against a candidate from a party unconnected to a paramilitary group), and measure its interaction with the terms in the baseline RD

[59] However, in Table XXXVI in the appendix I present the the results of a specification that includes the same terms as the baseline RD specification in Eq. (1), but now also interacts D and the polynomial terms with the dummy for the election to municipal council of a party with paramilitary links. As expected, the interaction term is negative and statistically significant for all key specifications.

[60] Table XXXVII in the appendix provides evidence in this direction, showing that for the baseline RD specification in Eq. (1), a larger council does not affect the probability of electing a mayor from a party linked to paramilitaries.

[61] For the not-robustness result see footnote 56.

specification in Eq. (1).[62] Tables XX and XXI present the results for combinations of normalized population and margin of victory bandwidths. These combinations are made in order to have information for at least 200 elections.[63] The dependent variable is the probability of selective killing averaged quarterly (Table XX) and yearly (Table XXI).[64] In both tables the interaction term is statistically significant for all specifications, confirming the results presented in Tables XVII to XIX and providing additional evidence of a causal link between paramilitary political representation and selective killings.

Finally, I propose several exercises to evaluate the incentives that paramilitaries may have for reducing the number of conflict-related killings in municipalities where they have direct political representation. Results in Tables VIII and IX suggest that paramilitary groups do not reduce their level of violent action. Previously I proposed that this was the case because direct political representation acts as a deterrent: while collaboration with guerrillas and retaliation by paramilitaries are expected to decrease, collaboration among paramilitary groups is expected to rise, so in equilibrium we should not expect any change in the level of violent action. I now test the robustness of this conclusion by considering an alternative explanation based on a potential increase in the time horizon of paramilitary groups.

Tables XXII and XXIII show the RD estimates of the effect of a larger municipal council on certain key fiscal outcomes: capital expenditures (investments in urban infrastructure, education, health and housing), current expenditures (supplies and government employee salaries), revenue from local taxes and capital revenue (transfers from the central government and royalties from natural resource extraction).[65] The increased participation of political parties with paramilitary links may increase their capacity for extracting rents through friendly means (for instance, from natural resource royalties, as suggested by Dube and Vargas (2013)), providing an incentive to substitute rent extraction for violence. Both tables show that the estimated effect for all fiscal outcomes is not statistically

[62]Specifically, I combine a new RD specification with the baseline RD specification in Eq. (1), and estimate the following model:

$$Y_{mt+1} = \alpha + \beta_d D_{mt} + \beta_p P_{mt} + \beta_i D_{mt} \times P_{mt} + f(\tilde{N}_{mt}, margvic_{mt}, \boldsymbol{\gamma}) + \delta_t + \zeta_T + \epsilon_{mt}$$

where, for the new terms, P_{mt} is a dummy that takes on a value of 1 if a candidate from a party with paramilitary links won the mayoral race, $margvic_{m,t}$ is the mayor's margin of victory, defined as the difference between the percentage of votes received by the winner and that received by the second-place candidate (see Ferreira and Gyourko, 2009, 2011), and $f(\cdot)$ is a kth-order polynomial that now includes terms not only for the normalized population, but also for the margin of victory, as well as the interactions among them and with D_{mt} and P_{mt}. I focus on the effect of a mayor with paramilitary links and a larger municipal council, β_i. Figure XVI and Table **??** in the appendix show that the two additional conditions for identification (absence of selective sorting and a balanced sample for pre-treatment characteristics around the win-loss threshold) are satisfied.

[63]To accomplish this I use a minimum window of 20% for both normalized population and margin of victory.

[64]I focus on quarterly and yearly data to better exploit the variability for selective killings. The results for the council's entire term of office, (see Table XXXVIII in the appendix) also exhibit this pattern, but the estimates are not statistically significant at least at 5%.

[65]The data are from the Colombian National Planning Department (DNP) and can be accessed at https://www.dnp.gov.co/programas/desarrollo-territorial/Paginas/ejecuciones-presupuestales.aspx.

significant.

Although results presented in Tables XXII and XXIII provide no evidence of rent-seeking, it may be that resources are extracted by reducing public goods provision. Tables XXIV and XXV look at some certain key indicators of local public goods provision: public school enrollment, access to clean water, access to sewerage and the percentage of poor with health insurance.[66] Once again, the estimates reveal that the effect is not statistically significant in any specification.

Finally, Tables XXVI and XXVII examine the possibility of greater rent extraction from coca cultivation, one of the main sources of funding for paramilitaries in Colombia (see Diaz and Sanchez, 2004). The tables show no evidence of increased coca cultivation in municipalities with larger councils, and a plausible small reduction in aerial spraying (of coca cultivations), which is however not robust to key specifications.

6 Conclusion

This study examines how the increased participation and representation of political parties in local government affect violence and armed conflict. The study focuses on Colombia, a country with serious deficiencies in the capacity of the state to monopolize violence, but that remains a democracy, at least if judged by standards such as regular and open elections. The study exploits arbitrary discontinuities in the number of councillors in a municipality to isolate plausibly exogenous variation in the level of representation of different political parties and of conflict-related violence. Regression discontinuity estimates show that third parties are represented more frequently in municipalities with larger councils, and that this phenomenon particularly benefits parties linked with paramilitary groups. RD estimates also suggest that the probability of a conflict-related homicide is significantly lower in municipalities with larger councils and with a higher number of councillors linked to paramilitary groups. Further analysis suggests that the lower level of conflict-related violence is associated with a rise in the coercive capacity of paramilitary groups and a consequent decrease in violent action by guerrillas.

Several opportunities exist for future research. While I have established that a higher level of paramilitary political representation results in less conflict-related violence, it is not clear how permanent this effect is. One could also examine the effect of paramilitary political representation on a wider set of variables, such as, for example, increased political representation at higher levels of government. Finally, there is the question of how increased political representation affects the capacity of the Colombian state to monopolize violence.

[66] The data on public school enrollments come from the Ministry of National Education (MEN), on access to clean water and sewerage from the Public Services Information System (SUI), and on the percentage of poor with health insurance from the Ministry of Health and Social Protection (MSPS).

Tables and Figures

Table I: Local councils in Colombia during the period 1997-2007

		obs in bins of (relative to upper cut-off)					
	council	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15	
population size	members	below	above	below	above	below	above
0-5000	7	47	68	94	118	136	167
5001-10000	9	78	103	180	195	270	279
10001-20000	11	65	71	151	137	256	210
20001-50000	13	34	28	64	50	95	70
50001-100000	15	16	9	29	16	42	26
100001-250000	17	2	5	7	9	12	14
250001-1000000	19	1	0	2	0	3	1
1000001 -	21	.	.	.	.	.	.

Notes: Columns 1 and 2 summarize the mapping of population size into council size as prescribed by the Law 136 of 1994: if a municipality's population is less or equal to 5000, the council must consist of 9 members; if the population is larger than 5000 but less or equal to 10000 the law states that the council size must be 9, etc. Columns 3-7 show the number of observations for different bandwidths h (the widths of the window of observations used for the regressions).

Table II: Pre-treatment characteristics

	All the sample			5% population spread				
	obs.	mean	st. dev.	obs.	mean	st. dev.	RD estimate	SE on estimate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Conflict-related violence (pre-election term)								
Overall selective killings probability	4283	0.049	0.096	231	0.071	0.106	0.009	0.043
Selective assassination probability	4283	0.044	0.089	231	0.064	0.099	0.002	0.041
Massacre probability	4283	0.008	0.027	231	0.010	0.022	0.012	0.011
Overall selective killing rate	4283	7.590	19.130	231	7.252	14.318	3.037	5.273
Selective assassination rate	4283	4.679	11.604	231	4.590	9.294	-0.552	3.597
Massacre rate	4283	2.913	11.073	231	2.662	7.303	3.589	2.913
Armed conflict (pre-election term)								
Action by guerrilla	4282	0.350	0.381	231	0.449	0.399	-0.188	0.150
Action by paramilitaries	4282	0.130	0.240	231	0.197	0.283	0.083	0.143
Action by Nal. army	4282	0.313	0.360	231	0.446	0.396	-0.205	0.135
Encounter paramilitaries vs guerrilla	4282	0.080	0.200	231	0.120	0.236	0.019	0.129
Encounter Nal. army vs guerrilla	4282	0.256	0.342	231	0.361	0.383	-0.176	0.146
Encounter Nal. army vs paramilitaries	4282	0.068	0.180	231	0.113	0.223	-0.009	0.090
Event of massive expulsion	4283	0.064	0.176	231	0.106	0.231	0.040	0.097
Kidnapping rate	2694	22.708	37.167	193	13.543	14.381	0.466	4.966
Crime (pre-election term)								
Overall homicide rate	4282	60.251	98.627	231	61.628	57.129	-29.688	16.274
Elections (previous election)								
Turnout rate	2141	0.597	0.121	118	0.567	0.109	0.044	0.037
Number of parties in council	4283	3.476	1.639	231	4.069	1.690	0.531	0.558
Council fractionalization	4292	0.524	0.213	231	0.579	0.188	0.021	0.063
Liberal party in council	5315	0.874	0.332	231	0.892	0.311	0.152	0.115
Conservative party in council	5315	0.731	0.444	231	0.680	0.468	-0.022	0.155
Left-wing party in council	5315	0.203	0.402	231	0.277	0.449	0.067	0.205
Party with paramilitary links in council	5315	0.312	0.463	231	0.468	0.500	-0.253	0.175
Mayor from Liberal party	4949	0.390	0.488	224	0.379	0.486	-0.139	0.163
Mayor from Conservative party	4949	0.262	0.440	224	0.201	0.402	0.138	0.169
Mayor from left-wing party	4949	0.021	0.145	224	0.036	0.186	0.139	0.144
Mayor from party with paramilitary links	4949	0.085	0.279	224	0.138	0.346	-0.041	0.140
Economy and institutions								
Municipal category (first year of term)	5315	5.707	1.006	231	5.459	1.215	0.355	0.362
% unsatisfied basic needs (1993 or 2005)	2177	48.908	20.351	231	49.823	21.662	-3.622	5.450
Schools per 1000 inhab. (1997)	964	43.547	27.533	220	38.131	21.964	1.226	7.896
Hospitals per 1000 inhab. (1997)	964	3.818	6.018	220	2.860	2.468	0.678	0.756
Bank branches per 1000 inhab. in 1997	738	10.923	7.324	197	7.340	3.722	1.702	1.343
Courts per 1000 inhab. (1997)	966	14.677	12.310	219	9.598	7.194	4.521	2.849
Police stations per 1000 inhab. (1997)	962	9.560	9.071	217	4.387	2.178	-0.510	0.723
Fiscal outcomes (pre-election term)								
Log current spending per capita	4222	-2.326	0.540	230	-2.482	0.665	0.029	0.177
Log fixed capital spending per capita	4223	-1.939	0.700	230	-2.293	0.682	-0.299	0.239
Log other capital spending per capita	4217	-2.033	0.950	230	-2.168	0.827	-0.126	0.149
Log tax revenue per capita	4216	-3.601	1.164	229	-3.447	1.152	-0.012	0.251
Log royalties per capita	2531	-4.863	2.528	159	-5.020	2.621	0.836	1.487
Log transfers per capita	4166	-1.544	0.632	228	-1.878	0.528	-0.090	0.133
Total deficit per capita	4227	-0.017	0.250	230	-0.071	0.658	0.104	0.117
Geographic characteristics								
Surface area (km2)	1094	873.226	2965.908	231	1527.174	5466.492	-334.936	1098.505
Mean altitude (m)	933	1307.483	953.628	223	1157.991	950.122	187.845	285.698
Distance to Bogota (km)	1095	314.037	188.281	231	354.047	204.386	-0.516	19.127
Distance to the capital of department (km)	1095	79.044	56.097	231	73.764	56.245	12.378	17.545
% Municipalities in the Atlantic coast	1096	0.175	0.380	231	0.234	0.424	0.056	0.164
% Municipalities in the eastern region	1096	0.359	0.480	231	0.264	0.442	0.160	0.172
% Municipalities in the central region	1096	0.141	0.348	231	0.134	0.342	0.042	0.136
% Municipalities in the Pacific coast	1096	0.161	0.368	231	0.216	0.413	-0.222	0.155
% Municipalities in Antioquia	1096	0.114	0.318	231	0.104	0.306	0.002	0.130
% Municipalities in the Amazon region	1096	0.048	0.215	231	0.048	0.213	-0.039	0.086

Notes: Data on municipal public finance are from the National Planning Department (DNP). Electoral data are from the Electoral Agency. Data on population and proportion of people with Unsatisfied Basic Needs (used as a proxy for poverty) are from the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE). Data on the number of courts, bank branches, hospitals, schools and community organization are from a non-profit civil foundation, the Social Foundation (Fundacion Social). Data on homicides are from the National Police. Data on forced migrant households are from the Presidential Agency for Social Action (Accion Social). Column (7) reports the coefficient on bigger council size (D) from equation (**??**) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable, for quadratic polynomial, and a bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) of 5 percent point; column (8) reports the RD standard errors.

Table III: Effect of council size on baseline electoral outcomes in council elections

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15		h: I-K
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Voter turnout	0.010	0.021	0.010	0.012	-0.005	0.020	0.011
	(0.028)	(0.046)	(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.019)
R-squared	0.594	0.601	0.524	0.529	0.507	0.512	0.498
Observations	178	178	365	365	573	573	803
Number of parties in race	0.394	1.034	-0.002	0.459	0.199	0.293	0.309
	(0.788)	(1.190)	(0.521)	(0.813)	(0.402)	(0.621)	(0.524)
R-squared	0.597	0.599	0.589	0.596	0.582	0.583	0.578
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	986
Number of parties in council	1.389***	1.753**	0.544*	1.188**	0.590**	0.772**	0.832***
	(0.475)	(0.694)	(0.304)	(0.483)	(0.230)	(0.366)	(0.290)
R-squared	0.505	0.509	0.445	0.455	0.394	0.395	0.379
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1093
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	quadratic

Notes: All columns report the coefficient for having a bigger council size (D) from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. The bandwidth in Column (7) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Imbes-Kalynaram as implemented in state rdob.ado. All columns include fixed effects for year, population threshold and department. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table IV: Effect of council size on third parties electoral outcomes in council elections

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15		h: I-K
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Number of third parties in race	0.246	0.863	-0.150	0.323	0.038	0.149	0.204
	(0.784)	(1.186)	(0.511)	(0.805)	(0.393)	(0.616)	(0.539)
R-squared	0.587	0.588	0.587	0.596	0.579	0.580	0.574
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	934
Number of third parties in council	1.256***	1.594**	0.443	1.087**	0.437**	0.709**	0.681**
	(0.460)	(0.719)	(0.288)	(0.475)	(0.218)	(0.352)	(0.266)
R-squared	0.546	0.548	0.478	0.489	0.430	0.431	0.408
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1183
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	quadratic

Notes: All columns report the coefficient for having a bigger council size (D) from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. The bandwidth in Column (7) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Imbes-Kalynaram as implemented in state rdob.ado. All columns include fixed effects for year, population threshold and department. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table V: Effect of council size on political violence and crime: quarterly average

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15		h: I-K
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: probability of selective killing							
All selective killings	-0.066***	-0.074**	-0.041***	-0.060**	-0.035***	-0.053***	-0.051**
	(0.024)	(0.037)	(0.015)	(0.029)	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.023)
R-squared	0.153	0.154	0.135	0.137	0.136	0.137	0.144
Observations	3252	3252	6568	6568	10292	10292	8172
Selective assassination	-0.058***	-0.068*	-0.036***	-0.052**	-0.032***	-0.046**	-0.046**
	(0.022)	(0.036)	(0.014)	(0.026)	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.020)
R-squared	0.153	0.153	0.134	0.135	0.135	0.135	0.140
Observations	3252	3252	6568	6568	10292	10292	8876
Massacre	-0.010*	-0.005	-0.003	-0.008	-0.001	-0.006	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)
R-squared	0.049	0.049	0.044	0.045	0.039	0.040	0.043
Observations	3252	3252	6568	6568	10292	10292	14260
Panel B: selective killing rate							
All selective killings	-0.398	-0.622	-0.303*	-0.125	-0.136	-0.336	-0.284
	(0.247)	(0.381)	(0.177)	(0.302)	(0.141)	(0.207)	(0.228)
R-squared	0.074	0.075	0.053	0.054	0.052	0.052	0.052
Observations	3252	3252	6568	6568	10292	10292	8488
Selective assassination	-0.348*	-0.544*	-0.249**	-0.227	-0.148	-0.295*	-0.265
	(0.194)	(0.321)	(0.119)	(0.231)	(0.101)	(0.154)	(0.174)
R-squared	0.087	0.090	0.066	0.066	0.061	0.062	0.067
Observations	3252	3252	6568	6568	10292	10292	8620
Massacre	-0.050	-0.078	-0.054	0.102	0.012	-0.041	0.027
	(0.094)	(0.142)	(0.090)	(0.128)	(0.065)	(0.097)	(0.113)
R-squared	0.035	0.035	0.025	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.025
Observations	3252	3252	6568	6568	10292	10292	8036
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the quarterly average of the corresponding measure. Panel A examines average probabilities, and Panel B rates per 100,000 inhabitants. All columns report the coefficient for having a bigger council size (D) from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)-(6) is 15 percentage point. The bandwidth in Column (7) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Imbes-Kalynaram as implemented in state rdob.ado. All columns include fixed effects for quarter, year, population threshold and department. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table VI: Effect of council size on political violence and crime: yearly average

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15		h: I-K
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: probability of selective killing							
All selective killings	-0.066***	-0.074*	-0.041***	-0.060**	-0.035***	-0.053***	-0.055**
	(0.024)	(0.038)	(0.015)	(0.029)	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.022)
R-squared	0.272	0.272	0.241	0.244	0.245	0.245	0.249
Observations	813	813	1642	1642	2573	2573	2272
Selective assassination	-0.058***	-0.068*	-0.036**	-0.052*	-0.032***	-0.046**	-0.048**
	(0.022)	(0.036)	(0.014)	(0.027)	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.020)
R-squared	0.280	0.280	0.246	0.249	0.250	0.250	0.260
Observations	813	813	1642	1642	2573	2573	2406
Massacre	-0.010*	-0.005	-0.003	-0.008	-0.001	-0.006	-0.003
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)
R-squared	0.120	0.121	0.116	0.118	0.105	0.107	0.106
Observations	813	813	1642	1642	2573	2573	3618
Panel B: selective killing rate							
All selective killings	-0.398	-0.622	-0.303*	-0.125	-0.136	-0.336	-0.389*
	(0.252)	(0.390)	(0.179)	(0.305)	(0.142)	(0.208)	(0.226)
R-squared	0.139	0.141	0.113	0.115	0.107	0.108	0.112
Observations	813	813	1642	1642	2573	2573	2272
Selective assassination	-0.348*	-0.544*	-0.249**	-0.227	-0.148	-0.295*	-0.164
	(0.198)	(0.328)	(0.121)	(0.233)	(0.102)	(0.155)	(0.152)
R-squared	0.160	0.165	0.129	0.130	0.112	0.113	0.111
Observations	813	813	1642	1642	2573	2573	2951
Massacre	-0.050	-0.078	-0.054	0.102	0.012	-0.041	0.021
	(0.096)	(0.145)	(0.091)	(0.130)	(0.066)	(0.098)	(0.104)
R-squared	0.100	0.100	0.078	0.081	0.082	0.082	0.082
Observations	813	813	1642	1642	2573	2573	3284
Panel C: other killings							
Homicide rate	-9.447	-42.566**	-2.576	-8.078	-1.165	-2.645	2.018
	(12.926)	(21.438)	(8.775)	(15.056)	(7.035)	(11.181)	(7.346)
R-squared	0.288	0.299	0.262	0.262	0.229	0.229	0.231
Observations	813	813	1642	1642	2573	2573	5339
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the yearly average of the corresponding measure. Panel A examines average probabilities, and Panel B rates per 100,000 inhabitants. All columns report the coefficient for having a bigger council size (D) from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. The bandwidth in Column (7) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Imbes-Kalynaram as implemented in state rdob.ado. All columns include fixed effects for year, population threshold and department. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table VII: Effect of council size on conflict-related violence: average over electoral term

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15		h: I-K
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: probability of selective killing							
All selective killings	-0.064**	-0.071*	-0.040**	-0.054*	-0.036***	-0.051**	-0.041**
	(0.026)	(0.041)	(0.017)	(0.031)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.020)
R-squared	0.401	0.402	0.353	0.356	0.358	0.359	0.344
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	788
Selective assassination	-0.055**	-0.064	-0.035**	-0.046*	-0.032***	-0.043**	-0.037**
	(0.024)	(0.039)	(0.015)	(0.028)	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.018)
R-squared	0.412	0.412	0.363	0.366	0.366	0.367	0.351
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	857
Massacre	-0.011*	-0.005	-0.004	-0.009	-0.001	-0.007	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)
R-squared	0.299	0.302	0.241	0.246	0.210	0.213	0.186
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1030
Panel B: selective killing rate							
All selective killings	-4.493	-7.322	-3.816	-0.552	-1.772	-3.796	-1.244
	(3.414)	(5.190)	(2.441)	(4.099)	(1.876)	(2.772)	(3.144)
R-squared	0.239	0.242	0.197	0.202	0.170	0.171	0.155
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	922
Selective assassination	-3.916	-6.483	-3.062*	-2.139	-1.927	-3.381*	-1.423
	(2.587)	(4.213)	(1.572)	(2.925)	(1.299)	(1.943)	(2.056)
R-squared	0.247	0.254	0.199	0.201	0.171	0.172	0.173
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	893
Massacre	-0.577	-0.839	-0.754	1.587	0.155	-0.415	0.867
	(1.368)	(2.079)	(1.284)	(1.858)	(0.908)	(1.368)	(1.957)
R-squared	0.234	0.235	0.178	0.186	0.154	0.154	0.132
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	898
Panel C: other killings							
Homicide rate	-8.672	-42.040*	-2.008	-5.596	-0.888	-1.320	2.774
	(13.916)	(22.883)	(9.603)	(15.752)	(7.634)	(11.816)	(7.298)
R-squared	0.383	0.396	0.351	0.352	0.292	0.292	0.296
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1634
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the average of the corresponding measure over the council's term. Panel A examines average probabilities, and Panel B rates per 100,000 inhabitants. All columns report the coefficient for having a bigger council size (D) from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. The bandwidth in Column (7) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Imbes-Kalynaram as implemented in state rdob.ado. All columns include fixed effects for year, population threshold and department. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table VIII: Effect of council size on armed conflict: yearly average

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15		h: I-K
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: existence of a violent action by							
Guerrilla or paramilitaries	-0.206**	-0.249*	-0.095*	-0.178**	-0.042	-0.125*	-0.093
	(0.086)	(0.127)	(0.056)	(0.089)	(0.046)	(0.067)	(0.068)
R-squared	0.290	0.290	0.200	0.204	0.205	0.207	0.198
Observations	693	693	1382	1382	2181	2181	2365
National army	-0.233***	-0.345***	-0.135**	-0.211**	-0.076	-0.180***	-0.125**
	(0.078)	(0.126)	(0.054)	(0.087)	(0.046)	(0.066)	(0.061)
R-squared	0.294	0.297	0.200	0.203	0.192	0.195	0.198
Observations	693	693	1382	1382	2181	2181	2613
Guerrilla	-0.232**	-0.226	-0.108*	-0.203**	-0.078*	-0.139*	-0.119*
	(0.094)	(0.138)	(0.058)	(0.096)	(0.046)	(0.072)	(0.068)
R-squared	0.305	0.305	0.232	0.238	0.229	0.230	0.223
Observations	693	693	1382	1382	2181	2181	2553
Paramilitaries	-0.108	-0.157	-0.026	-0.048	0.007	-0.038	-0.026
	(0.077)	(0.121)	(0.051)	(0.081)	(0.040)	(0.064)	(0.053)
R-squared	0.208	0.209	0.145	0.149	0.131	0.132	0.126
Observations	693	693	1382	1382	2181	2181	3097
Panel B: existence of an armed encounter between							
Paramilitaries vs guerrilla	-0.119*	-0.053	-0.039	-0.053	-0.031	-0.047	-0.014
	(0.069)	(0.111)	(0.047)	(0.074)	(0.034)	(0.058)	(0.052)
R-squared	0.183	0.186	0.123	0.129	0.116	0.116	0.116
Observations	693	693	1382	1382	2181	2181	2593
National army vs guerrilla	-0.246***	-0.360***	-0.132**	-0.197**	-0.084*	-0.164**	-0.155**
	(0.084)	(0.130)	(0.055)	(0.092)	(0.045)	(0.069)	(0.062)
R-squared	0.314	0.317	0.213	0.216	0.212	0.213	0.215
Observations	693	693	1382	1382	2181	2181	2746
Nal. army vs paramilitaries	-0.161**	-0.263**	-0.093**	-0.119*	-0.039	-0.114**	-0.064
	(0.065)	(0.106)	(0.043)	(0.070)	(0.033)	(0.054)	(0.048)
R-squared	0.238	0.241	0.165	0.171	0.147	0.149	0.141
Observations	693	693	1382	1382	2181	2181	2593
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the average of the corresponding measure over the year. All columns report the coefficient for having a bigger council size (D) from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. The bandwidth in Column (7) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Imbes-Kalynaram as implemented in state rdob.ado. All columns include fixed effects for year, population threshold and department. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table IX: Effect of council size on armed conflict: average over the electoral term

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15		h: I-K
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: existence of a violent action by							
Guerrilla or paramilitaries	-0.231**	-0.267*	-0.109*	-0.195**	-0.063	-0.143**	-0.098*
	(0.092)	(0.136)	(0.057)	(0.093)	(0.045)	(0.070)	(0.056)
R-squared	0.460	0.461	0.329	0.336	0.327	0.330	0.303
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1213
National army	-0.247***	-0.355**	-0.148**	-0.215**	-0.091*	-0.192***	-0.177***
	(0.088)	(0.146)	(0.057)	(0.094)	(0.047)	(0.071)	(0.061)
R-squared	0.447	0.451	0.316	0.320	0.294	0.298	0.305
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	934
Guerrilla	-0.257***	-0.232	-0.117**	-0.227**	-0.087*	-0.156**	-0.129**
	(0.097)	(0.146)	(0.058)	(0.098)	(0.046)	(0.072)	(0.063)
R-squared	0.452	0.452	0.362	0.370	0.354	0.356	0.335
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1015
Paramilitaries	-0.112	-0.154	-0.030	-0.047	-0.007	-0.037	-0.043
	(0.078)	(0.121)	(0.051)	(0.080)	(0.039)	(0.063)	(0.052)
R-squared	0.357	0.359	0.253	0.260	0.230	0.233	0.215
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	981
Panel B: existence of an armed encounter between							
Paramilitaries vs guerrilla	-0.120*	-0.057	-0.035	-0.058	-0.030	-0.043	-0.041
	(0.067)	(0.110)	(0.045)	(0.072)	(0.033)	(0.056)	(0.040)
R-squared	0.294	0.299	0.204	0.215	0.197	0.198	0.191
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1320
National army vs guerrilla	-0.264***	-0.356**	-0.145***	-0.219**	-0.097**	-0.181***	-0.178***
	(0.087)	(0.139)	(0.056)	(0.094)	(0.045)	(0.070)	(0.061)
R-squared	0.465	0.468	0.327	0.332	0.320	0.322	0.310
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	986
Nal. army vs paramilitaries	-0.159**	-0.253**	-0.087**	-0.112	-0.045	-0.103*	-0.081*
	(0.065)	(0.109)	(0.042)	(0.069)	(0.032)	(0.053)	(0.046)
R-squared	0.398	0.404	0.286	0.299	0.262	0.265	0.244
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	907
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the average of the corresponding measure over council's term. All columns report the coefficient for having a bigger council size (D) from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. The bandwidth in Column (7) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Imbes-Kalynaram as implemented in state rdob.ado. All columns include fixed effects for year, population threshold and department. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table X: Effect of presence of military bases: quarterly average

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: probability						
Bigger council size	-0.067**	-0.085*	-0.037**	-0.059*	-0.034***	-0.051**
	(0.027)	(0.045)	(0.017)	(0.032)	(0.013)	(0.023)
Bigger council size × military base	-0.005	0.142	-0.042	-0.110	0.107	-0.109
	(0.083)	(0.151)	(0.068)	(0.120)	(0.071)	(0.068)
R-squared	0.176	0.177	0.175	0.177	0.159	0.162
Observations	2772	2772	5528	5528	8724	8724
Panel B: rate						
Bigger council size	-0.520*	-0.692	-0.259	-0.155	-0.105	-0.307
	(0.272)	(0.483)	(0.185)	(0.345)	(0.146)	(0.230)
Bigger council size × military base	-0.353	0.918	-0.159	-0.512	0.037	-0.586
	(1.230)	(1.855)	(0.340)	(0.675)	(0.351)	(0.493)
R-squared	0.082	0.083	0.066	0.067	0.061	0.062
Observations	2772	2772	5528	5528	8724	8724
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the quarterly average probability and rate of all selective killings. All columns use the RD specification described in Eq. (1)), and include interactions between the normalized population terms and the dummy for the presence of a military base. All columns report the coefficient on the interaction term between the dummy for a bigger council and the dummy for a military base. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. All columns include fixed effects for quarter, year, electoral period, population threshold and department, as well as controls for surface area, distance to the both Bogota and the capital of the department, average homicide rate and average presence of violent actions by any group, both over the period between 1988 and the year of the election. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%

Table XI: Effect of presence of military bases: yearly average

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: probability						
Bigger council size	-0.067**	-0.085*	-0.037**	-0.059*	-0.034***	-0.051**
	(0.028)	(0.046)	(0.018)	(0.032)	(0.013)	(0.023)
Bigger council size × military base	-0.005	0.142	-0.042	-0.110	0.107	-0.109
	(0.085)	(0.156)	(0.069)	(0.122)	(0.072)	(0.068)
R-squared	0.310	0.312	0.310	0.312	0.284	0.289
Observations	693	693	1382	1382	2181	2181
Panel B: rate						
Bigger council size	-0.470	-0.666	-0.278	-0.071	-0.087	-0.289
	(0.303)	(0.496)	(0.210)	(0.378)	(0.174)	(0.255)
Bigger council size × military base	-0.661	0.388	-0.242	-0.693	-0.015	-0.906
	(1.639)	(2.390)	(0.383)	(0.801)	(0.387)	(0.598)
R-squared	0.154	0.154	0.134	0.136	0.130	0.132
Observations	693	693	1382	1382	2181	2181
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the yearly average probability and rate of all selective killings. All columns use the RD specification described in Eq. (1)), and include interactions between the normalized population terms and the dummy for the presence of a military base. All columns report the coefficient on the interaction term between the dummy for a bigger council and the dummy for a military base. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. All columns include fixed effects for year, electoral period, population threshold and department, as well as controls for surface area, distance to the both Bogota and the capital of the department, average homicide rate and average presence of violent actions by any group, both over the period between 1988 and the year of the election. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%

Table XII: Effect of presence of military bases: average over the term

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: probability						
Bigger council size	-0.055**	-0.074*	-0.034**	-0.046	-0.032**	-0.044**
	(0.027)	(0.044)	(0.017)	(0.031)	(0.012)	(0.022)
Bigger council size × military base	-0.011	0.117	-0.057	-0.104	0.089	-0.112*
	(0.082)	(0.178)	(0.064)	(0.111)	(0.066)	(0.062)
R-squared	0.446	0.449	0.458	0.461	0.416	0.424
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729
Panel B: rate						
Bigger council size	-0.331	-0.616	-0.264	0.009	-0.096	-0.256
	(0.312)	(0.511)	(0.208)	(0.368)	(0.170)	(0.249)
Bigger council size × military base	-0.828	0.095	-0.275	-0.853	-0.049	-0.858
	(1.700)	(2.667)	(0.399)	(0.831)	(0.393)	(0.556)
R-squared	0.254	0.257	0.238	0.243	0.210	0.212
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the probability and rate of all selective killings averaged over the electoral term . All columns use the RD specification described in Eq. (1)), and include interactions between the normalized population terms and the dummy for the presence of a military base. All columns report the coefficient on the interaction term between the dummy for a bigger council and the dummy for a military base. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)-(6) is 15 percentage point. All columns include fixed effects for year, population threshold and department, as well as controls for surface area, distance to the both Bogota and the capital of the department, average homicide rate and average presence of violent actions by any group, both over the period between 1988 and the year of the election. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%

Table XIII: Effect of council size on participation and success of parties in council elections

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15		h: I-K
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: participation							
Paramilitary linked party	0.107	0.044	0.076	0.066	0.037	0.092	0.038
	(0.089)	(0.157)	(0.070)	(0.094)	(0.055)	(0.081)	(0.064)
R-squared	0.326	0.328	0.315	0.319	0.283	0.284	0.282
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1237
Left-wing party	-0.023	0.185	-0.006	0.115	0.015	0.025	0.070
	(0.130)	(0.182)	(0.089)	(0.127)	(0.073)	(0.106)	(0.069)
R-squared	0.380	0.387	0.287	0.293	0.285	0.285	0.279
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1724
Liberal party	0.061	0.033	0.032	0.066	0.072*	0.029	0.044
	(0.064)	(0.078)	(0.049)	(0.064)	(0.043)	(0.056)	(0.044)
R-squared	0.226	0.227	0.182	0.186	0.153	0.154	0.130
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1463
Conservative party	0.087	0.137	0.117*	0.069	0.089*	0.115	0.118*
	(0.102)	(0.174)	(0.064)	(0.109)	(0.052)	(0.081)	(0.060)
R-squared	0.359	0.361	0.286	0.290	0.245	0.246	0.221
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1313
Panel B: success							
Paramilitary linked party	0.245***	0.344*	0.153**	0.231**	0.125**	0.168**	0.143**
	(0.094)	(0.175)	(0.070)	(0.099)	(0.054)	(0.083)	(0.062)
R-squared	0.463	0.465	0.381	0.384	0.349	0.349	0.345
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1270
Left-wing party	0.095	0.120	0.029	0.161	-0.017	0.053	0.004
	(0.112)	(0.179)	(0.077)	(0.119)	(0.062)	(0.096)	(0.070)
R-squared	0.337	0.344	0.238	0.242	0.232	0.235	0.204
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1332
Liberal party	-0.010	-0.080	-0.041	-0.012	0.042	-0.069	0.007
	(0.095)	(0.130)	(0.061)	(0.094)	(0.053)	(0.072)	(0.062)
R-squared	0.188	0.189	0.175	0.176	0.163	0.169	0.139
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1042
Conservative party	0.143	0.240	0.142*	0.113	0.112*	0.132	0.138
	(0.134)	(0.211)	(0.082)	(0.140)	(0.064)	(0.103)	(0.091)
R-squared	0.321	0.328	0.281	0.282	0.237	0.239	0.232
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	897
Paramilitary linked and left-wing	0.200*	0.362**	0.077	0.221**	0.029	0.120	0.042
	(0.106)	(0.156)	(0.067)	(0.107)	(0.052)	(0.083)	(0.057)
R-squared	0.297	0.311	0.220	0.228	0.192	0.194	0.161
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1429
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	quadratic

Notes: All columns report the coefficient for having a bigger council size (D) from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. The bandwidth in Column (7) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Imbes-Kalynaram as implemented in state rdob.ado. All columns include fixed effects for year, population threshold and department. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table XIV: Effect of exposure to previous conflict-related violence: quarterly average

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A						
Bigger council size	-0.035	-0.050	-0.012	-0.019	-0.029*	-0.014
	(0.029)	(0.045)	(0.019)	(0.032)	(0.015)	(0.024)
Bigger council size × massive expulsion in past	-0.364**	-0.320	-0.243**	-0.392**	0.099	-0.359***
	(0.140)	(0.202)	(0.094)	(0.153)	(0.101)	(0.103)
R-squared	0.188	0.192	0.179	0.183	0.163	0.168
Observations	2772	2772	5528	5528	8724	8724
Panel B						
Bigger council size	0.051	0.020	0.035	0.064	0.008	0.040
	(0.041)	(0.069)	(0.025)	(0.044)	(0.019)	(0.033)
Bigger council size × kidnappings in the past	-0.362**	-0.275	-0.228***	-0.379**	-0.130*	-0.289***
	(0.140)	(0.219)	(0.085)	(0.156)	(0.067)	(0.110)
R-squared	0.184	0.185	0.172	0.175	0.159	0.161
Observations	2772	2772	5528	5528	8724	8724
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the quarterly average probability of all selective killings. All columns use the RD specification described in Eq. (1)), and include interactions between the normalized population terms and the proxies for past exposure to events of massive expulsion or kidnapping. All columns report the coefficient on the interaction term between the dummy for a bigger council and the respective proxy for past exposure. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. All columns include fixed effects for quarter, year, electoral period, population threshold and department, as well as controls for surface area, distance to the both Bogota and the capital of the department, average homicide rate and average presence of violent actions by any group, both over the period between 1988 and the year of the election. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%

Table XV: Effect of exposure to previous conflict-related violence: yearly average

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A						
Bigger council size	-0.035	-0.050	-0.012	-0.019	-0.029*	-0.014
	(0.030)	(0.046)	(0.019)	(0.032)	(0.015)	(0.024)
Bigger council size × massive expulsion in past	-0.364**	-0.320	-0.243**	-0.392**	0.099	-0.359***
	(0.144)	(0.208)	(0.096)	(0.155)	(0.102)	(0.104)
R-squared	0.330	0.337	0.316	0.323	0.291	0.301
Observations	693	693	1382	1382	2181	2181
Panel B						
Bigger council size	0.051	0.020	0.035	0.064	0.008	0.040
	(0.042)	(0.071)	(0.025)	(0.045)	(0.019)	(0.033)
Bigger council size × kidnappings in the past	-0.362**	-0.275	-0.228***	-0.379**	-0.130*	-0.289***
	(0.145)	(0.226)	(0.087)	(0.159)	(0.068)	(0.111)
R-squared	0.324	0.326	0.304	0.310	0.284	0.288
Observations	693	693	1382	1382	2181	2181
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the yearly average probability of all selective killings. All columns use the RD specification described in Eq. (1)), and include interactions between the normalized population terms and the proxies for past exposure to events of massive expulsion or kidnapping. All columns report the coefficient on the interaction term between the dummy for a bigger council and the respective proxy for past exposure. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. All columns include fixed effects for year, electoral period, population threshold and department, as well as controls for surface area, distance to the both Bogota and the capital of the department, average homicide rate and average presence of violent actions by any group, both over the period between 1988 and the year of the election. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%

Table XVI: Effect of exposure to previous conflict-related violence: average over term

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A						
Bigger council size	-0.024	-0.041	-0.011	-0.009	-0.027*	-0.010
	(0.028)	(0.043)	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.023)
Bigger council size × massive expulsion in past	-0.386***	-0.426*	-0.262***	-0.431***	0.091	-0.380***
	(0.144)	(0.216)	(0.101)	(0.166)	(0.102)	(0.105)
R-squared	0.486	0.498	0.469	0.482	0.430	0.446
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729
Panel B						
Bigger council size	0.044	0.028	0.038	0.061	0.011	0.042
	(0.043)	(0.070)	(0.025)	(0.042)	(0.018)	(0.031)
Bigger council size × kidnappings in the past	-0.302**	-0.274	-0.228***	-0.336**	-0.132**	-0.278***
	(0.147)	(0.222)	(0.084)	(0.151)	(0.063)	(0.107)
R-squared	0.468	0.471	0.448	0.457	0.418	0.422
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the probability of all selective killings averaged over the electoral term. All columns use the RD specification described in Eq. (1)), and include interactions between the normalized population terms and the proxies for past exposure to events of massive expulsion or kidnapping. All columns report the coefficient on the interaction term between the dummy for a bigger council and the respective proxy for past exposure. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. All columns include fixed effects for year, population threshold and department, as well as controls for surface area, distance to the both Bogota and the capital of the department, average homicide rate and average presence of violent actions by any group, both over the period between 1988 and the year of the election. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%

Table XVII: Effect of mayor's party: quarterly regressions

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A						
Bigger council size	-0.041*	-0.039	-0.024	-0.031	-0.025*	-0.033
	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.013)	(0.021)
Bigger council size × mayor from paramilitary	-0.344***	-0.562***	-0.095	-0.327***	-0.060	-0.145*
	(0.079)	(0.141)	(0.067)	(0.086)	(0.048)	(0.081)
R-squared	0.205	0.209	0.177	0.186	0.165	0.170
Observations	2656	2656	5244	5244	8024	8024
Panel B						
Bigger council size	-0.070***	-0.085*	-0.040**	-0.060*	-0.035***	-0.051**
	(0.026)	(0.043)	(0.017)	(0.031)	(0.013)	(0.023)
Bigger council size × mayor from left-wing	0.058	-0.134	0.129	0.052	0.067	0.017
	(0.096)	(0.118)	(0.084)	(0.113)	(0.082)	(0.101)
R-squared	0.187	0.189	0.175	0.177	0.164	0.165
Observations	2656	2656	5244	5244	8024	8024
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the quarterly average probability of all selective killings. All columns use the RD specification described in Eq. (1)), and include interactions between the normalized population terms and the dummy for a mayor from a paramilitary-linked party. All columns report the coefficient on the interaction term between the dummy for a bigger council and the dummy for a mayor from a paramilitary-linked party. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. All columns include fixed effects for quarter, year, electoral period, population threshold and department, as well as controls for surface area, distance to the both Bogota and the capital of the department, average homicide rate and average presence of violent actions by any group, both over the period between 1988 and the year of the election. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%

Table XVIII: Effect of mayor's party: yearly regressions

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A						
Bigger council size	-0.041*	-0.039	-0.024	-0.031	-0.025*	-0.033
	(0.024)	(0.035)	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.013)	(0.021)
Bigger council size × mayor from paramilitary	-0.344***	-0.562***	-0.095	-0.327***	-0.060	-0.145*
	(0.082)	(0.145)	(0.068)	(0.088)	(0.049)	(0.082)
R-squared	0.358	0.364	0.313	0.329	0.294	0.302
Observations	664	664	1311	1311	2006	2006
Panel B						
Bigger council size	-0.070***	-0.085*	-0.040**	-0.060*	-0.035***	-0.051**
	(0.027)	(0.045)	(0.017)	(0.032)	(0.013)	(0.023)
Bigger council size × mayor from left-wing	0.058	-0.134	0.129	0.052	0.067	0.017
	(0.099)	(0.122)	(0.086)	(0.115)	(0.083)	(0.102)
R-squared	0.327	0.330	0.309	0.314	0.291	0.294
Observations	664	664	1311	1311	2006	2006
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the yearly average probability of all selective killings. All columns use the RD specification described in Eq. (1)), and include interactions between the normalized population terms and the dummy for a mayor from a paramilitary-linked party. All columns report the coefficient on the interaction term between the dummy for a bigger council and the dummy for a mayor from a paramilitary-linked party. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. All columns include fixed effects for year, electoral period, population threshold and department, as well as controls for surface area, distance to the both Bogota and the capital of the department, average homicide rate and average presence of violent actions by any group, both over the period between 1988 and the year of the election. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%

Table XIX: Effect of mayor's party: electoral term regressions

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A						
Bigger council size	-0.034	-0.039	-0.026	-0.026	-0.026**	-0.033
	(0.024)	(0.035)	(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.013)	(0.021)
Bigger council size × mayor from paramilitary	-0.319***	-0.559***	-0.055	-0.282***	-0.039	-0.095
	(0.093)	(0.161)	(0.067)	(0.096)	(0.045)	(0.083)
R-squared	0.509	0.522	0.449	0.470	0.425	0.434
Observations	222	222	443	443	678	678
Panel B						
Bigger council size	-0.058**	-0.077*	-0.038**	-0.049	-0.032**	-0.045**
	(0.026)	(0.044)	(0.017)	(0.031)	(0.013)	(0.022)
Bigger council size × mayor from left-wing	0.050	-0.109	0.104	0.028	0.058	-0.010
	(0.097)	(0.128)	(0.079)	(0.104)	(0.075)	(0.091)
R-squared	0.463	0.469	0.445	0.451	0.423	0.425
Observations	222	222	443	443	678	678
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the probability of all selective killings averaged over the electoral term. All columns use the RD specification described in Eq. (1)), and include interactions between the normalized population terms and the dummy for a mayor from a paramilitary-linked party. All columns report the coefficient on the interaction term between the dummy for a bigger council and the dummy for a mayor from a paramilitary-linked party. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. All columns include fixed effects for ear, electoral period, population threshold and department, as well as controls for surface area, distance to the both Bogota and the capital of the department, average homicide rate and average presence of violent actions by any group, both over the period between 1988 and the year of the election. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%

Table XX: Effect of mayor's party: close elections - quarterly average

	h=0.20		h=0.30		h=0.40	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: bandwidth for margin of victory 0.20						
Big council	0.029	0.163*	0.023	0.025	0.045**	0.021
	(0.030)	(0.085)	(0.023)	(0.064)	(0.020)	(0.054)
Big council × mayor from paramilitary	-0.099**	-0.352***	-0.079**	-0.258***	-0.030	-0.207***
	(0.044)	(0.134)	(0.034)	(0.090)	(0.032)	(0.079)
R-squared	0.208	0.229	0.179	0.193	0.204	0.221
Observations	3016	3016	4224	4224	4832	4832
Panel B: bandwidth for margin of victory 0.30						
Big council	0.008	0.122*	0.009	0.019	0.031*	-0.005
	(0.025)	(0.066)	(0.020)	(0.053)	(0.018)	(0.046)
Big council × mayor from paramilitary	-0.061	-0.269***	-0.034	-0.135*	-0.016	-0.158**
	(0.037)	(0.101)	(0.031)	(0.076)	(0.029)	(0.069)
R-squared	0.192	0.208	0.156	0.171	0.184	0.199
Observations	3464	3464	4872	4872	5540	5540
Panel C: bandwidth for margin of victory 0.40						
Big council	0.004	0.117**	0.011	0.041	0.033**	0.006
	(0.021)	(0.057)	(0.017)	(0.046)	(0.016)	(0.041)
Big council × mayor from paramilitary	-0.049	-0.346***	-0.021	-0.153**	-0.022	-0.156**
	(0.034)	(0.093)	(0.028)	(0.069)	(0.026)	(0.063)
R-squared	0.194	0.210	0.157	0.170	0.184	0.197
Observations	3680	3680	5136	5136	5820	5820
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the quarterly average probability of all selective killings. All columns use the RD specification described in Eq. (1)), and include interactions between the normalized population terms and the dummy for a mayor from a paramilitary-linked party. All columns report the coefficient on the interaction term between the dummy for a bigger council and the dummy for a mayor from a paramilitary-linked party. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 20 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 30 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 40 percentage point. All columns include fixed effects for quarter, year, electoral period, population threshold and department, as well as controls for surface area, distance to the both Bogota and the capital of the department, average homicide rate and average presence of violent actions by any group, both over the period between 1988 and the year of the election. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%

Table XXI: Effect of mayor's party: close elections - quarterly average

	h=0.20		h=0.30		h=0.40	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: bandwidth for margin of victory 0.20						
Big council	0.029	0.163	0.023	0.025	0.045*	0.021
	(0.041)	(0.113)	(0.031)	(0.082)	(0.026)	(0.068)
Big council × mayor from paramilitary	-0.099*	-0.352**	-0.079*	-0.258**	-0.030	-0.207**
	(0.058)	(0.172)	(0.045)	(0.115)	(0.042)	(0.098)
R-squared	0.361	0.396	0.308	0.332	0.340	0.369
Observations	754	754	1056	1056	1208	1208
Panel B: bandwidth for margin of victory 0.30						
Big council	0.008	0.122	0.009	0.019	0.031	-0.005
	(0.033)	(0.088)	(0.026)	(0.068)	(0.023)	(0.057)
Big council × mayor from paramilitary	-0.061	-0.269**	-0.034	-0.135	-0.016	-0.158*
	(0.048)	(0.124)	(0.041)	(0.096)	(0.039)	(0.086)
R-squared	0.340	0.368	0.273	0.299	0.313	0.340
Observations	866	866	1218	1218	1385	1385
Panel C: bandwidth for margin of victory 0.40						
Big council	0.004	0.117	0.011	0.041	0.033	0.006
	(0.028)	(0.075)	(0.022)	(0.059)	(0.021)	(0.052)
Big council × mayor from paramilitary	-0.049	-0.346***	-0.021	-0.153*	-0.022	-0.156*
	(0.044)	(0.115)	(0.037)	(0.086)	(0.035)	(0.080)
R-squared	0.341	0.370	0.274	0.298	0.314	0.337
Observations	920	920	1284	1284	1455	1455
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the yearly average probability of all selective killings. All columns use the RD specification described in Eq. (1)), and include interactions between the normalized population terms and the dummy for a mayor from a paramilitary-linked party. All columns report the coefficient on the interaction term between the dummy for a bigger council and the dummy for a mayor from a paramilitary-linked party. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 20 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 30 percent point, and in Columns (5)-(6) is 40 percentage point. All columns include fixed effects for year, electoral period, population threshold and department, as well as controls for surface area, distance to the both Bogota and the capital of the department, average homicide rate and average presence of violent actions by any group, both over the period between 1988 and the year of the election. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%

Table XXII: Effect of council size on fiscal outcomes: yearly

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15		h: I-K
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Capital spending (invesment)	0.078	-0.097	-0.019	0.003	0.029	-0.016	-0.006
	(0.111)	(0.169)	(0.079)	(0.121)	(0.061)	(0.097)	(0.086)
R-squared	0.542	0.547	0.524	0.525	0.516	0.516	0.486
Observations	781	781	1583	1583	2463	2463	3197
Current spending	0.044	0.066	0.006	0.063	0.110*	0.003	0.060
	(0.087)	(0.127)	(0.066)	(0.092)	(0.057)	(0.078)	(0.074)
R-squared	0.477	0.477	0.399	0.400	0.381	0.383	0.386
Observations	781	781	1586	1586	2465	2465	2784
Tax revenue	0.093	-0.016	0.098	0.063	0.254**	0.048	0.044
	(0.172)	(0.223)	(0.121)	(0.174)	(0.107)	(0.145)	(0.148)
R-squared	0.616	0.616	0.560	0.561	0.541	0.543	0.543
Observations	775	775	1580	1580	2454	2454	2399
Transfers from central gov.	0.161**	-0.004	0.041	0.090	0.037	0.081	0.001
	(0.075)	(0.121)	(0.054)	(0.082)	(0.046)	(0.067)	(0.055)
R-squared	0.486	0.491	0.429	0.430	0.420	0.420	0.431
Observations	773	773	1578	1578	2451	2451	3575
Revenue from resource royalties	-0.362	0.557	-0.184	0.001	-0.061	-0.080	-0.199
	(0.734)	(1.215)	(0.541)	(0.806)	(0.449)	(0.676)	(0.628)
R-squared	0.473	0.480	0.416	0.427	0.420	0.422	0.417
Observations	418	418	829	829	1278	1278	1446
Total deficit	-0.013	0.008	0.032	-0.021	0.014	0.018	0.004
	(0.017)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.030)	(0.015)
R-squared	0.155	0.157	0.039	0.040	0.029	0.030	0.024
Observations	782	782	1588	1588	2469	2469	5497
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	quadratic

Notes: The dependent is the value of the corresponding measure of fiscal outcome. All columns report the coefficient for having a bigger council size (D) from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. The bandwidth in Column (7) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Imbes-Kalynaram as implemented in state rdob.ado. All columns include fixed effects for year, population threshold and department. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table XXIII: Effect of council size on fiscal outcomes: average over the electoral term

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15		h: I-K
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Capital spending (invesment)	0.092	-0.123	0.001	0.018	0.041	0.006	-0.002
	(0.115)	(0.170)	(0.077)	(0.117)	(0.062)	(0.092)	(0.071)
R-squared	0.573	0.580	0.559	0.560	0.548	0.548	0.551
Observations	229	229	461	461	722	722	1322
Current spending	0.009	0.029	-0.030	0.029	0.065	-0.017	0.024
	(0.102)	(0.148)	(0.083)	(0.099)	(0.068)	(0.090)	(0.076)
R-squared	0.511	0.512	0.410	0.410	0.400	0.403	0.412
Observations	229	229	461	461	723	723	1341
Tax revenue	0.054	-0.070	0.085	0.029	0.235**	0.024	0.190
	(0.184)	(0.255)	(0.123)	(0.180)	(0.111)	(0.144)	(0.130)
R-squared	0.638	0.639	0.589	0.590	0.567	0.569	0.538
Observations	228	228	460	460	722	722	1006
Transfers from central gov.	0.152*	0.014	0.040	0.086	0.019	0.080	0.046
	(0.082)	(0.128)	(0.054)	(0.083)	(0.045)	(0.067)	(0.049)
R-squared	0.569	0.574	0.545	0.546	0.505	0.506	0.499
Observations	228	228	460	460	722	722	1347
Revenue from resource royalties	-0.014	0.245	-0.054	0.017	0.205	-0.074	-0.150
	(0.706)	(1.061)	(0.492)	(0.751)	(0.421)	(0.614)	(0.598)
R-squared	0.538	0.540	0.424	0.432	0.419	0.423	0.420
Observations	163	163	335	335	522	522	540
Total deficit	-0.011	0.025	0.032	-0.017	0.010	0.018	0.001
	(0.019)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.014)	(0.033)	(0.016)
R-squared	0.239	0.253	0.092	0.095	0.053	0.057	0.036
Observations	229	229	461	461	723	723	1584
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the average of the corresponding measure of fiscal outcome over the electoral term. All columns report the coefficient for having a bigger council size (D) from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. The bandwidth in Column (7) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Imbes-Kalynaram as implemented in state rdob.ado. All columns include fixed effects for year, population threshold and department. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table XXIV: Effect of council size on local public goods provision: yearly

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15		h: I-K
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Public school enrollment	0.017*	0.017	0.010	0.029***	0.006	0.015*	0.007
	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)
R-squared	0.506	0.520	0.413	0.418	0.373	0.374	0.376
Observations	730	730	1471	1471	2306	2306	3514
Poor with health insurance	-0.002	-0.041	0.005	-0.003	0.027	-0.005	-0.006
	(0.034)	(0.051)	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.031)
R-squared	0.481	0.482	0.458	0.459	0.416	0.417	0.418
Observations	813	813	1642	1642	2573	2573	2446
Access to clear water	-0.009*	-0.012	-0.004	-0.007	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)
R-squared	0.356	0.362	0.308	0.309	0.311	0.311	0.260
Observations	377	377	758	758	1169	1169	2032
Sewerage access	-0.012**	-0.012	-0.004	-0.009	-0.004	-0.004	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
R-squared	0.344	0.345	0.318	0.320	0.305	0.306	0.184
Observations	377	377	758	758	1169	1169	2962
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	quadratic

Notes: The dependent is the value of the corresponding measure of local public good provision. All columns report the coefficient for having a bigger council size (D) from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. The bandwidth in Column (7) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Imbes-Kalynaram as implemented in state rdob.ado. All columns include fixed effects for year, population threshold and department. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table XXV: Effect of council size on local public goods provision: average over term

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15		h: I-K
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Public school enrollment	0.017	0.017	0.011	0.029***	0.006	0.015	0.011
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)
R-squared	0.527	0.542	0.431	0.436	0.396	0.397	0.397
Observations	228	228	459	459	716	716	1138
Poor with health insurance	-0.001	-0.044	0.010	-0.003	0.035	-0.004	0.003
	(0.038)	(0.057)	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.024)	(0.032)	(0.031)
R-squared	0.585	0.587	0.541	0.541	0.474	0.476	0.484
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	753
Access to clear water	-0.011*	-0.013	-0.004	-0.009	-0.002	-0.005	-0.003
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)
R-squared	0.422	0.427	0.352	0.354	0.347	0.348	0.348
Observations	121	121	249	249	388	388	398
Sewerage access	-0.011*	-0.012	-0.002	-0.008	-0.002	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
R-squared	0.422	0.424	0.372	0.376	0.337	0.341	0.370
Observations	121	121	249	249	388	388	355
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the average of the corresponding measure of local public good provision over the electoral term. All columns report the coefficient for having a bigger council size (D) from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. The bandwidth in Column (7) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Imbes-Kalynaram as implemented in state rdob.ado. All columns include fixed effects for year, population threshold and department. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table XXVI: Effect of council size on coca cultivation and aerial spraying: yearly average

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15		h: I-K
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Coca cultivations	-183.321	-231.694	22.128	-153.497	46.920	-18.850	-71.505
	(137.925)	(228.532)	(105.079)	(166.438)	(81.894)	(132.363)	(135.949)
R-squared	0.515	0.518	0.481	0.484	0.567	0.568	0.482
Observations	542	542	1080	1080	1722	1722	1401
Aerial spraying on coca cultivations	-221.345**	-290.078*	-160.095	-207.382	16.242	-194.870*	-199.112
	(107.723)	(171.043)	(109.785)	(127.582)	(77.931)	(102.373)	(135.699)
R-squared	0.265	0.267	0.292	0.292	0.254	0.257	0.293
Observations	587	587	1182	1182	1871	1871	1141
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the value of the corresponding measure of coca cultivation or aerial spraying. The data is from the Center of Studies on Economic Development, that compiled and processed the information provided by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The data is available for the period 2000-2009. All columns report the coefficient for having a bigger council size (D) from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. The bandwidth in Column (7) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Imbes-Kalynaram as implemented in state rdob.ado. All columns include fixed effects for year, population threshold and department. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table XXVII: Effect of council size on coca cultivation and spraying: average over term

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15		h: I-K
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Coca cultivations	-57.684	-61.029	98.876	32.398	87.825	126.290	115.020
	(140.474)	(238.153)	(133.225)	(210.007)	(99.154)	(197.778)	(159.247)
R-squared	0.579	0.582	0.474	0.475	0.514	0.516	0.427
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1085
Aerial spraying on coca cultivations	-154.358	-247.769	-155.562	-128.342	-0.045	-177.410**	-89.670
	(95.894)	(151.395)	(105.630)	(114.122)	(64.801)	(89.837)	(87.461)
R-squared	0.423	0.425	0.439	0.439	0.386	0.390	0.216
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1295
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the average of the corresponding measure of coca cultivation or aerial spraying over the electoral term. The data come from the Center of Studies on Economic Development, that compiled and processed the information provided by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The data are available for the period 2000-2009. All columns report the coefficient for having a bigger council size (D) from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. The bandwidth in Column (7) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Imbes-Kalynaram as implemented in state rdob.ado. All columns include fixed effects for year, population threshold and department. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Figure I: Geographical distribution of events of selective killings



Figure II: Selective killing and overall homicide rate, 1993-2010



The figure plots rates per 100,000 population. The vertical lines identify the years when local elections occurred. The selective killing data are from the Historical Memory Group (GMH). The data on homicide are from the Colombian National Police.

Figure III: McCrary tests by individual threshold



(a) 5,000 threshold



(b) 10,000 threshold



(c) 20,000 threshold



(d) 50,000 threshold



(e) 100,000 threshold



(f) 250,000 threshold

All figures pool all years, and show finely-gridded histograms of the population smoothed using local linear regression, separately on either side of the cutoff of the density function of the population (see McCrary, 2008). Each figure uses data only around the corresponding population threshold. The estimates of the difference in the height at the threshold are: (a) 0.326 with se (0.190); (b) 0.390 with se (0.191); (c) 0.111 with se (0.182); (d) -0.057 with se (0.309); (e) -0.316 with se (0.441); (f) -0.207 with se (0.669).

Figure IV: McCrary test: pooled thresholds



(a) All population thresholds



(b) 5,000 to 250,000 thresholds

Both figures pool all years, and show finely-gridded histograms of the normalized population smoothed using local linear regression, separately on either side of the cutoff of the density function of the normalized population (see McCrary, 2008). While figure in Panel (a) pools all thresholds, figure in Panel (b) excludes the two smallest (those corresponding to population of 5,000 and 10,000). In Panel (a) the estimate of the difference in the height at the zero threshold is equal to 0.177 with se (0.091); n Panel (b) the estimate is equal to 0.035 with se (0.143).

Figure V: Municipal Category and population size



(a) (b)

Panel (a) shows the scatterplot of the municipal category versus population size; Panel (b) shows the scatterplot averaged over 1000-inhabitant bins plus running-mean smoothing performed separately in each interval between two thresholds. The vertical lines identify the population thresholds (except the 250,000 threshold) used in the determination of the council size.

Figure VI: Current spending and population size



(a) (b)

Panel (a) shows the scatterplot of current spending versus population size; Panel (b) shows the scatterplot averaged over 1000-inhabitant bins plus running-mean smoothing performed separately in each interval between two thresholds. The vertical lines identify the population thresholds (except the 250,000 threshold) used in the determination of the council size.

Figure VII: RD figures for baseline electoral outcomes



(a) previous election



(b) current election



(c) previous election



(d) current election



(e) previous election



(f) current election

Outcome against the normalized population size, with a negative value indicating smaller legislatures. Each point represents the average value of the outcome in population spread bins of width of one half of a percentage point. The solid line plots predicted values, with separate quadratic population spread trends on either side of the threshold. The dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals.

Figure VIII: RD figures for electoral outcomes of third parties



(a) previous election



(b) current election



(c) previous election



(d) current election

Outcome against the normalized population size, with a negative value indicating smaller legislatures. Each point represents the average value of the outcome in population spread bins of width of one half of a percentage point. The solid line plots predicted values, with separate quadratic population spread trends on either side of the threshold. The dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals.

Figure IX: RD figures for all selective killings



(a) pre-election (prob.)



(b) post-election (prob.)



(c) pre-election (rate)



(d) post-election (rate)

Outcome against the normalized population size, with a negative value indicating smaller legislatures. Each point represents the average value of the outcome in population spread bins of width of one half of a percentage point. The solid line plots predicted values, with separate quadratic population spread trends on either side of the threshold. The dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals.

Figure X: RD figures for selective assassination



(a) pre-election (prob.)



(b) post-election (prob.)



(c) pre-election (rate)



(d) post-election (rate)

Outcome against the normalized population size, with a negative value indicating smaller legislatures. Each point represents the average value of the outcome in population spread bins of width of one half of a percentage point. The solid line plots predicted values, with separate quadratic population spread trends on either side of the threshold. The dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals.

Figure XI: RD figures for massacres



(a) pre-election (prob.)



(b) post-election (prob.)



(c) pre-election (rate)



(d) post-election (rate)

Outcome against the normalized population size, with a negative value indicating smaller legislatures. Each point represents the average value of the outcome in population spread bins of width of one half of a percentage point. The solid line plots predicted values, with separate quadratic population spread trends on either side of the threshold. The dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals.

Figure XII: RD figures for overall homicide rate)



(a) pre-election (b) post-election

Outcome against the normalized population size, with a negative value indicating smaller legislatures. Each point represents the average value of the outcome in population spread bins of width of one half of a percentage point. The solid line plots predicted values, with separate quadratic population spread trends on either side of the threshold. The dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals.

Figure XIII: Impact on selective killing probability by quarter



Figure shows the dummy for larger council coefficients against time, defined relative to each municipality's election (lines plot 95% confidence intervals).

Appendix

Figure XIV: Population distribution (below 11000)



Frequency of municipalities according to population size. The vertical lines identify the population thresholds (except the 250,000 threshold) used in the determination of the council size.

Figure XV: McCrary tests by election year



(a) 1997

(b) 2000

(c) 2003

(d) 2007

Finely-gridded histograms of the population (by year) smoothed using local linear regression, separately on either side of the cutoff of the density function of the population (McCrary, 2008).

Figure XVI: McCrary tests by for margin of victory of paramilitary-linked parties



(a) All population



(b) window for normalized population: 10%



(c) window for normalized population: 20%



(d) window for normalized population: 30%

All figures pool all years, and show finely-gridded histograms of the margin of victory of paramilitary-linked parties the using local linear regression, separately on either side of the cutoff of the density function of the margin of victory (see McCrary, 2008). Each figure uses data only around the corresponding population threshold. The estimates of the difference in the height at the threshold are: (a) -0.203 with se (0.156); (b) -0.054 with se (0.317); (c) - 0.280 with se (0.247); (d) -0.287 with se (0.185).

Table XXVIII: Pre-treatment characteristics

	2.5% population spread				
	obs.	mean	st. dev.	RD estimate	SE on estimate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Conflict-related violence (pre-election term)					
Overall selective killings probability	116	0.072	0.100	0.026	0.047
Selective assassination probability	116	0.066	0.096	0.015	0.045
Massacre probability	116	0.009	0.017	0.014	0.009
Overall selective killing rate	116	6.134	9.714	2.237	5.162
Selective assassination rate	116	3.969	7.303	-1.823	4.171
Massacre rate	116	2.165	5.647	4.059	3.423
Armed conflict (pre-election term)					
Action by guerrilla	116	0.467	0.405	-0.017	0.227
Action by paramilitaries	116	0.195	0.285	0.058	0.229
Action by Nal. army	116	0.477	0.412	-0.154	0.156
Encounter paramilitaries vs guerrilla	116	0.129	0.250	-0.100	0.183
Encounter Nal. army vs guerrilla	116	0.387	0.398	-0.119	0.206
Encounter Nal. army vs paramilitaries	116	0.103	0.215	-0.047	0.122
Event of massive expulsion	116	0.110	0.248	0.043	0.148
Kidnapping rate	98	12.432	12.727	-0.733	7.877
Crime (pre-election term)					
Overall homicide rate	116	54.691	44.317	-46.063	25.586
Elections (previous election)					
Turnout rate	55	0.563	0.099	-0.013	0.085
Number of parties in council	116	3.991	1.524	1.378	0.847
Council fractionalization	116	0.580	0.175	0.157	0.088
Liberal party in council	116	0.905	0.294	0.078	0.219
Conservative party in council	116	0.638	0.483	0.211	0.254
Left-wing party in council	116	0.284	0.453	-0.196	0.367
Party with paramilitary links in council	116	0.517	0.502	-0.030	0.279
Mayor from Liberal party	111	0.342	0.477	-0.223	0.334
Mayor from Conservative party	111	0.207	0.407	-0.118	0.344
Mayor from left-wing party	111	0.036	0.187	0.089	0.241
Mayor from party with paramilitary links	111	0.180	0.386	-0.123	0.181
Economy and institutions					
Municipal category (first year of term)	116	5.371	1.335	0.712	0.584
% unsatisfied basic needs (1993 or 2005)	116	50.374	21.499	-4.038	8.206
Schools per 1000 inhab. (1997)	111	37.591	22.178	12.068	14.201
Hospitals per 1000 inhab. (1997)	111	2.954	2.354	1.981	1.304
Bank branches per 1000 inhab. in 1997	101	7.100	3.795	3.642	2.133
Courts per 1000 inhab. (1997)	111	9.538	6.752	3.301	4.643
Police stations per 1000 inhab. (1997)	109	4.230	2.047	0.560	1.068
Fiscal outcomes (pre-election term)					
Log current spending per capita	116	-2.492	0.647	0.337	0.296
Log fixed capital spending per capita	116	-2.415	0.679	-0.679	0.377
Log other capital spending per capita	116	-2.225	0.786	-0.115	0.192
Log tax revenue per capita	116	-3.520	1.077	-0.207	0.422
Log royalties per capita	85	-5.011	2.514	1.775	2.904
Log transfers per capita	116	-1.914	0.470	-0.158	0.158
Total deficit per capita	116	-0.094	0.904	-0.482	0.465
Geographic characteristics					
Surface area (km2)	116	1594.576	4736.007	-1731.323	3487.132
Mean altitude (m)	111	1134.893	933.600	491.100	499.098
Distance to Bogota (km)	116	365.048	200.742	10.184	34.895
Distance to the capital of department (km)	116	75.073	60.121	12.074	37.399
% Municipalities in the Atlantic coast	116	0.250	0.435	0.199	0.265
% Municipalities in the eastern region	116	0.267	0.444	0.079	0.285
% Municipalities in the central region	116	0.129	0.337	-0.031	0.215
% Municipalities in the Pacific coast	116	0.198	0.400	-0.241	0.211
% Municipalities in Antioquia	116	0.129	0.337	0.097	0.212
% Municipalities in the Amazon region	116	0.026	0.159	-0.104	0.132

Notes: Data on municipal public finance are from the National Planning Department (DNP). Electoral data are from the Electoral Agency. Data on population and proportion of people with Unsatisfied Basic Needs (used as a proxy for poverty) are from the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE). Data on the number of courts, bank branches, hospitals, schools and community organization are from a non-profit civil foundation, the Social Foundation (Fundacion Social). Data on homicides are from the National Police. Data on forced migrant households are from the Presidential Agency for Social Action (Accion Social). Column (7) reports the coefficient on bigger council size (D) from equation (**??**) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable, for quadratic polynomial, and a bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) of 5 percent point; column (8) reports the RD standard errors.

Table XXIX: Pre-treatment characteristics

		10% population spread			
	obs.	mean	st. dev.	RD estimate	SE on estimate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Conflict-related violence (pre-election term)					
Overall selective killings probability	465	0.074	0.114	-0.012	0.029
Selective assassination probability	465	0.067	0.106	-0.013	0.027
Massacre probability	465	0.013	0.035	-0.003	0.007
Overall selective killing rate	465	7.967	16.077	-2.969	3.323
Selective assassination rate	465	4.979	9.732	-3.685	2.180
Massacre rate	465	2.989	8.834	0.716	2.104
Armed conflict (pre-election term)					
Action by guerrilla	465	0.469	0.403	-0.124	0.108
Action by paramilitaries	465	0.200	0.277	-0.046	0.085
Action by Nal. army	465	0.442	0.387	-0.155	0.091
Encounter paramilitaries vs guerrilla	465	0.120	0.239	-0.019	0.077
Encounter Nal. army vs guerrilla	465	0.355	0.378	-0.109	0.095
Encounter Nal. army vs paramilitaries	465	0.109	0.217	-0.004	0.053
Event of massive expulsion	465	0.106	0.228	-0.056	0.066
Kidnapping rate	385	13.339	16.925	3.225	3.914
Crime (pre-election term)					
Overall homicide rate	465	63.476	64.217	-10.838	11.449
Elections (previous election)					
Turnout rate	245	0.569	0.110	0.033	0.028
Number of parties in council	465	4.116	1.708	0.274	0.390
Council fractionalization	465	0.583	0.183	-0.003	0.041
Liberal party in council	465	0.908	0.290	0.104	0.071
Conservative party in council	465	0.703	0.457	-0.008	0.114
Left-wing party in council	465	0.267	0.443	0.012	0.120
Party with paramilitary links in council	465	0.460	0.499	0.001	0.121
Mayor from Liberal party	442	0.410	0.492	-0.069	0.140
Mayor from Conservative party	442	0.210	0.408	0.142	0.120
Mayor from left-wing party	442	0.032	0.175	0.036	0.080
Mayor from party with paramilitary links	442	0.118	0.323	0.041	0.102
Economy and institutions					
Municipal category (first year of term)	465	5.439	1.263	0.250	0.226
% unsatisfied basic needs (1993 or 2005)	465	49.348	22.116	-3.699	3.557
Schools per 1000 inhab. (1997)	436	37.201	20.518	-0.668	4.876
Hospitals per 1000 inhab. (1997)	436	2.966	2.822	0.627	0.581
Bank branches per 1000 inhab. in 1997	391	7.502	3.770	1.232	0.941
Courts per 1000 inhab. (1997)	437	10.108	7.930	3.324	2.002
Police stations per 1000 inhab. (1997)	434	4.511	2.196	-0.280	0.428
Fiscal outcomes (pre-election term)					
Log current spending per capita	460	-2.501	0.579	0.106	0.113
Log fixed capital spending per capita	460	-2.280	0.619	-0.013	0.174
Log other capital spending per capita	460	-2.189	0.877	-0.038	0.108
Log tax revenue per capita	459	-3.441	1.138	0.071	0.174
Log royalties per capita	301	-5.200	2.691	0.916	0.796
Log transfers per capita	457	-1.837	0.526	0.082	0.088
Total deficit per capita	460	-0.032	0.469	-0.063	0.110
Geographic characteristics					
Surface area (km2)	465	1315.496	4315.423	-680.327	764.863
Mean altitude (m)	448	1214.151	969.384	-31.567	185.490
Distance to Bogota (km)	465	355.375	194.785	-9.110	14.425
Distance to the capital of department (km)	465	75.296	58.547	-0.835	12.347
% Municipalities in the Atlantic coast	465	0.234	0.424	0.018	0.120
% Municipalities in the eastern region	465	0.226	0.419	0.039	0.119
% Municipalities in the central region	465	0.155	0.362	0.067	0.102
% Municipalities in the Pacific coast	465	0.209	0.407	-0.109	0.113
% Municipalities in Antioquia	465	0.129	0.336	-0.041	0.103
% Municipalities in the Amazon region	465	0.047	0.213	0.025	0.061

Notes: Data on municipal public finance are from the National Planning Department (DNP). Electoral data are from the Electoral Agency. Data on population and proportion of people with Unsatisfied Basic Needs (used as a proxy for poverty) are from the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE). Data on the number of courts, bank branches, hospitals, schools and community organization are from a non-profit civil foundation, the Social Foundation (Fundacion Social). Data on homicides are from the National Police. Data on forced migrant households are from the Presidential Agency for Social Action (Accion Social). Column (7) reports the coefficient on bigger council size (D) from equation (**??**) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable, for quadratic polynomial, and a bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) of 5 percent point; column (8) reports the RD standard errors.

Table XXX: Effect of legislature size on violence by origin: quarterly average

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15		h: I-K
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: all selective killings							
Guerrilla	-0.008	-0.006	-0.002	-0.007	-0.005	-0.005	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)
R-squared	0.068	0.068	0.054	0.055	0.053	0.054	0.056
Observations	3252	3252	6568	6568	10292	10292	11200
Paramilitaries	-0.028*	-0.032	-0.014	-0.028	-0.010	-0.020	-0.021
	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.015)
R-squared	0.077	0.077	0.079	0.081	0.074	0.075	0.080
Observations	3252	3252	6568	6568	10292	10292	9088
Government	-0.014	-0.020	-0.004	-0.014	-0.006	-0.008	-0.007
	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.006)
R-squared	0.087	0.088	0.070	0.072	0.055	0.055	0.051
Observations	3252	3252	6568	6568	10292	10292	14028
Unknown	-0.019**	-0.013	-0.019***	-0.012	-0.014**	-0.019**	-0.015**
	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)
R-squared	0.133	0.133	0.097	0.098	0.097	0.098	0.094
Observations	3252	3252	6568	6568	10292	10292	12572
Panel B: selective assassination							
Guerrilla	-0.008*	-0.008	-0.003	-0.007	-0.004	-0.005	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)
R-squared	0.067	0.067	0.050	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.053
Observations	3252	3252	6568	6568	10292	10292	11184
Paramilitaries	-0.023*	-0.027	-0.009	-0.023	-0.008	-0.015	-0.013
	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.013)
R-squared	0.075	0.075	0.075	0.076	0.073	0.074	0.074
Observations	3252	3252	6568	6568	10292	10292	9852
Government	-0.013	-0.018	-0.003	-0.013	-0.005	-0.007	-0.005
	(0.009)	(0.016)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.006)
R-squared	0.086	0.088	0.071	0.073	0.055	0.056	0.048
Observations	3252	3252	6568	6568	10292	10292	15592
Unknown	-0.016**	-0.014	-0.019***	-0.012	-0.015***	-0.018**	-0.015**
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)
R-squared	0.127	0.127	0.094	0.094	0.096	0.096	0.091
Observations	3252	3252	6568	6568	10292	10292	12912
Panel C: massacres							
Guerrilla	0.001	0.003	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
R-squared	0.018	0.019	0.016	0.016	0.010	0.010	0.008
Observations	3252	3252	6568	6568	10292	10292	16708
Paramilitaries	-0.007	-0.007	-0.004	-0.006	-0.001	-0.005	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
R-squared	0.041	0.041	0.040	0.041	0.033	0.033	0.036
Observations	3252	3252	6568	6568	10292	10292	14340
Government	-0.013	-0.018	-0.003	-0.013	-0.005	-0.007	-0.005
	(0.009)	(0.016)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.006)
R-squared	0.086	0.088	0.071	0.073	0.055	0.056	0.048
Observations	3252	3252	6568	6568	10292	10292	15592
Unknown	-0.002*	0.001	-0.000	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
R-squared	0.030	0.031	0.017	0.017	0.013	0.014	0.013
Observations	3252	3252	6568	6568	10292	10292	16036
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the quarterly average of the corresponding measure. Panel A examines average probabilities, and Panel B rates per 100,000 inhabitants. All columns report the coefficient for having a bigger council size (D) from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. The bandwidth in Column (7) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Imbes-Kalynaram as implemented in state rdob.ado. All columns include fixed effects for year, population threshold and department. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table XXXI: Effect of legislature size on violence by origin: quarterly average

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15		h: I-K
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: all selective killings							
Guerrilla	-0.008	-0.006	-0.002	-0.007	-0.005	-0.005	-0.004
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)
R-squared	0.192	0.192	0.137	0.140	0.134	0.135	0.132
Observations	813	813	1642	1642	2573	2573	3063
Paramilitaries	-0.028*	-0.032	-0.014	-0.028	-0.010	-0.020	-0.020
	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.014)
R-squared	0.151	0.151	0.149	0.152	0.145	0.146	0.146
Observations	813	813	1642	1642	2573	2573	2538
Government	-0.014	-0.020	-0.004	-0.014	-0.006	-0.008	-0.007
	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.006)
R-squared	0.087	0.088	0.070	0.072	0.055	0.055	0.051
Observations	3252	3252	6568	6568	10292	10292	14028
Unknown	-0.019**	-0.013	-0.019***	-0.012	-0.014**	-0.019**	-0.015**
	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)
R-squared	0.133	0.133	0.097	0.098	0.097	0.098	0.094
Observations	3252	3252	6568	6568	10292	10292	12572
Panel B: selective assassination							
Guerrilla	-0.008	-0.008	-0.003	-0.007	-0.004	-0.005	-0.004
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)
R-squared	0.199	0.199	0.130	0.133	0.130	0.131	0.128
Observations	813	813	1642	1642	2573	2573	3089
Paramilitaries	-0.023*	-0.027	-0.009	-0.023	-0.008	-0.015	-0.011
	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.012)
R-squared	0.151	0.151	0.145	0.147	0.146	0.147	0.144
Observations	813	813	1642	1642	2573	2573	2711
Government	-0.013	-0.018	-0.003	-0.013	-0.005	-0.007	-0.005
	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.006)
R-squared	0.186	0.189	0.159	0.164	0.121	0.122	0.115
Observations	813	813	1642	1642	2573	2573	3646
Unknown	-0.016**	-0.014	-0.019***	-0.012	-0.015***	-0.018**	-0.015**
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)
R-squared	0.127	0.127	0.094	0.094	0.096	0.096	0.091
Observations	3252	3252	6568	6568	10292	10292	12912
Panel C: massacres							
Guerrilla	0.001	0.003	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
R-squared	0.072	0.075	0.060	0.061	0.036	0.036	0.027
Observations	813	813	1642	1642	2573	2573	4157
Paramilitaries	-0.007	-0.007	-0.004	-0.006	-0.001	-0.005	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
R-squared	0.102	0.102	0.107	0.109	0.093	0.094	0.095
Observations	813	813	1642	1642	2573	2573	3143
Government	-0.013	-0.018	-0.003	-0.013	-0.005	-0.007	-0.005
	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.006)
R-squared	0.186	0.189	0.159	0.164	0.121	0.122	0.115
Observations	813	813	1642	1642	2573	2573	3646
Unknown	-0.002*	0.001	-0.000	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
R-squared	0.108	0.111	0.059	0.059	0.049	0.051	0.043
Observations	813	813	1642	1642	2573	2573	3763
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the yearly average of the corresponding measure. Panel A examines average probabilities, and Panel B rates per 100,000 inhabitants. All columns report the coefficient for having a bigger council size (D) from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. The bandwidth in Column (7) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Imbes-Kalynaram as implemented in state rdob.ado. All columns include fixed effects for year, population threshold and department. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table XXXII: Effect of legislature size on violence by origin: average over term

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15		h: I-K
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: all selective killings							
Guerrilla	-0.006	-0.003	-0.002	-0.004	-0.005	-0.004	-0.009*
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)
R-squared	0.396	0.396	0.238	0.245	0.237	0.238	0.199
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1048
Paramilitaries	-0.027	-0.032	-0.014	-0.026	-0.011	-0.019	-0.014
	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.014)
R-squared	0.259	0.260	0.268	0.272	0.258	0.259	0.245
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	890
Government	-0.012	-0.018	-0.003	-0.012	-0.005	-0.007	-0.005
	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.005)
R-squared	0.318	0.322	0.287	0.297	0.218	0.220	0.209
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1168
Unknown	-0.019**	-0.013	-0.019***	-0.011	-0.014**	-0.018**	-0.016**
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)
R-squared	0.468	0.469	0.346	0.348	0.336	0.337	0.311
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1012
Panel B: selective assassination							
Guerrilla	-0.007	-0.006	-0.003	-0.004	-0.005	-0.004	-0.010**
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)
R-squared	0.407	0.407	0.224	0.230	0.232	0.234	0.193
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1071
Paramilitaries	-0.022	-0.026	-0.009	-0.021	-0.009	-0.013	-0.011
	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.012)
R-squared	0.259	0.260	0.265	0.270	0.263	0.264	0.247
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	871
Government	-0.011	-0.016	-0.003	-0.011	-0.004	-0.006	-0.004
	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.005)
R-squared	0.325	0.331	0.292	0.301	0.220	0.221	0.207
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1189
Unknown	-0.017*	-0.015	-0.019***	-0.010	-0.015**	-0.017**	-0.016**
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)
R-squared	0.460	0.461	0.346	0.349	0.339	0.340	0.311
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	994
Panel C: massacres							
Guerrilla	0.001	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.000	0.002	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
R-squared	0.181	0.188	0.155	0.157	0.100	0.101	0.066
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1183
Paramilitaries	-0.008	-0.007	-0.004	-0.007	-0.001	-0.006	-0.004
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)
R-squared	0.239	0.241	0.220	0.224	0.178	0.180	0.168
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	826
Government	-0.011	-0.016	-0.003	-0.011	-0.004	-0.006	-0.004
	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.005)
R-squared	0.325	0.331	0.292	0.301	0.220	0.221	0.207
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1189
Unknown	-0.002	0.002	-0.000	-0.000	0.001	-0.001	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
R-squared	0.285	0.295	0.154	0.154	0.109	0.117	0.115
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	952
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the average of the corresponding measure over the council's term. Panel A examines average probabilities, and Panel B rates per 100,000 inhabitants. All columns report the coefficient for having a bigger council size (D) from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. The bandwidth in Column (7) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Imbes-Kalynaram as implemented in state rdob.ado. All columns include fixed effects for year, population threshold and department. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table XXXIII: Effect of council size on party success: vote share and seat share

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15		h: I-K
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: vote share							
Paramilitary linked parties	0.077*	0.084	0.052**	0.058	0.041**	0.053*	0.073***
	(0.040)	(0.058)	(0.023)	(0.039)	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.025)
R-squared	0.514	0.515	0.476	0.480	0.430	0.430	0.396
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	942
Left-wing parties	-0.028	-0.018	-0.002	-0.024	-0.012	-0.005	-0.010
	(0.020)	(0.037)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.011)
R-squared	0.371	0.377	0.197	0.201	0.172	0.177	0.167
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1488
Liberals	-0.054	-0.053	-0.069**	-0.063	-0.031	-0.081**	-0.081**
	(0.044)	(0.057)	(0.034)	(0.046)	(0.028)	(0.040)	(0.040)
R-squared	0.546	0.546	0.435	0.437	0.410	0.412	0.412
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	729
Conservatives	0.081*	0.026	0.071***	0.077*	0.039*	0.074**	0.050*
	(0.042)	(0.063)	(0.027)	(0.043)	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.028)
R-squared	0.425	0.432	0.372	0.372	0.312	0.314	0.315
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	965
Panel B: seat share							
Paramilitary linked parties	0.114**	0.134	0.068**	0.090*	0.058**	0.076**	0.093***
	(0.055)	(0.082)	(0.030)	(0.052)	(0.023)	(0.038)	(0.029)
R-squared	0.449	0.450	0.407	0.411	0.379	0.379	0.359
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1099
Left-wing parties	-0.033	-0.021	-0.009	-0.032	-0.016	-0.015	-0.014
	(0.025)	(0.044)	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.013)
R-squared	0.346	0.349	0.199	0.202	0.173	0.178	0.153
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1567
Liberals	-0.082	-0.096	-0.069*	-0.092	-0.028	-0.092*	-0.086*
	(0.053)	(0.072)	(0.041)	(0.057)	(0.033)	(0.048)	(0.046)
R-squared	0.496	0.496	0.376	0.379	0.341	0.345	0.337
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	788
Conservatives	0.067	0.018	0.060*	0.061	0.030	0.066*	0.040
	(0.050)	(0.075)	(0.032)	(0.052)	(0.026)	(0.040)	(0.031)
R-squared	0.409	0.414	0.353	0.354	0.300	0.302	0.285
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729	1242
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	quadratic

Notes: All columns report the coefficient for having a bigger council size (D) from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. The bandwidth in Column (7) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Imbes-Kalynaram as implemented in state rdob.ado. All columns include fixed effects for year, population threshold and department. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table XXXIV: Effect of exposure to previous selective killing and conflict: yearly average

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: selective killings						
Bigger council size	0.055**	0.071	0.015	0.076**	0.012	0.035*
	(0.027)	(0.044)	(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.014)	(0.021)
Bigger council size × selective assassination in past	-0.454***	-0.536**	-0.195**	-0.492***	-0.158**	-0.324***
	(0.128)	(0.243)	(0.087)	(0.156)	(0.064)	(0.103)
R-squared	0.362	0.363	0.319	0.335	0.297	0.301
Observations	693	693	1382	1382	2181	2181
Bigger council size	0.013	0.051	-0.005	0.040	-0.012	0.001
	(0.024)	(0.036)	(0.016)	(0.026)	(0.013)	(0.020)
Bigger council size × massacres in the past	-1.200***	-1.728***	-0.515***	-1.414***	-0.311**	-0.788***
	(0.274)	(0.530)	(0.187)	(0.294)	(0.152)	(0.240)
R-squared	0.355	0.358	0.312	0.333	0.295	0.301
Observations	693	693	1382	1382	2181	2181
Panel A: violent actions						
Bigger council size	-0.023	-0.034	-0.012	-0.001	-0.011	-0.009
	(0.024)	(0.041)	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.014)	(0.020)
Bigger council size × actions by both groups in past	-0.513**	-0.435	-0.368**	-0.600**	-0.257*	-0.504***
	(0.254)	(0.364)	(0.147)	(0.295)	(0.138)	(0.192)
R-squared	0.328	0.341	0.305	0.311	0.289	0.292
Observations	693	693	1382	1382	2181	2181
Bigger council size	-0.070**	-0.094*	-0.048**	-0.052	-0.047***	-0.061**
	(0.030)	(0.054)	(0.020)	(0.036)	(0.014)	(0.026)
Bigger council size × actions by paramilitaries in past	-0.176	1.106	0.394	-0.313	0.552	0.535
	(0.840)	(1.232)	(0.416)	(0.808)	(0.342)	(0.537)
R-squared	0.296	0.301	0.266	0.271	0.258	0.258
Observations	693	693	1382	1382	2181	2181
Bigger council size	-0.067*	-0.004	-0.019	-0.055	-0.040**	-0.042
	(0.040)	(0.056)	(0.024)	(0.042)	(0.018)	(0.032)
Bigger council size × actions by guerrilla in past	-0.002	-0.546	-0.161	-0.025	0.049	-0.076
	(0.350)	(0.490)	(0.224)	(0.362)	(0.166)	(0.282)
R-squared	0.290	0.298	0.268	0.272	0.256	0.257
Observations	693	693	1382	1382	2181	2181
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the yearly average probability of all selective killings. All columns use the RD specification described in Eq. (1)), and include interactions between the normalized population terms and the proxies for past exposure to conflict-related violence and armed conflict. All columns report the coefficient on the interaction term between the dummy for a bigger council and and the respective proxy for past exposure. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. All columns include fixed effects for quarter, year, electoral period, population threshold and department, as well as controls for surface area, distance to the both Bogota and the capital of the department, average homicide rate and average presence of violent actions by any group, both over the period between 1988 and the year of the election. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%

Table XXXV: Effect of exposure to previous selective killing and conflict: average over term

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: selective killings						
Bigger council size	0.047	0.074	0.013	0.065**	0.013	0.031
	(0.029)	(0.046)	(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.014)	(0.021)
Bigger council size × selective assassination in past	-0.387***	-0.538**	-0.182**	-0.424***	-0.155**	-0.291***
	(0.141)	(0.251)	(0.087)	(0.161)	(0.060)	(0.103)
R-squared	0.521	0.525	0.468	0.489	0.436	0.441
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729
Bigger council size	0.016	0.050	-0.005	0.042*	-0.009	0.002
	(0.023)	(0.035)	(0.015)	(0.025)	(0.013)	(0.020)
Bigger council size × massacres in the past	-1.087***	-1.610***	-0.489***	-1.316***	-0.318**	-0.742***
	(0.283)	(0.556)	(0.184)	(0.303)	(0.153)	(0.233)
R-squared	0.512	0.518	0.460	0.488	0.432	0.440
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729
Panel A: violent actions						
Bigger council size	-0.016	-0.030	-0.008	0.006	-0.007	-0.004
	(0.024)	(0.038)	(0.016)	(0.026)	(0.013)	(0.019)
Bigger council size × actions by both groups in past	-0.486*	-0.389	-0.391***	-0.578**	-0.283**	-0.517***
	(0.263)	(0.386)	(0.139)	(0.291)	(0.122)	(0.176)
R-squared	0.486	0.504	0.454	0.464	0.424	0.429
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729
Bigger council size	-0.057*	-0.080	-0.048**	-0.042	-0.045***	-0.057**
	(0.029)	(0.051)	(0.019)	(0.034)	(0.013)	(0.024)
Bigger council size × actions by paramilitaries in past	-0.281	0.648	0.457	-0.325	0.567*	0.564
	(0.785)	(1.170)	(0.410)	(0.761)	(0.332)	(0.520)
R-squared	0.427	0.435	0.391	0.399	0.382	0.382
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729
Bigger council size	-0.053	-0.005	-0.016	-0.042	-0.038**	-0.032
	(0.041)	(0.058)	(0.024)	(0.042)	(0.017)	(0.031)
Bigger council size × actions by guerrilla in past	-0.039	-0.499	-0.175	-0.062	0.051	-0.129
	(0.352)	(0.503)	(0.224)	(0.359)	(0.164)	(0.279)
R-squared	0.418	0.429	0.396	0.401	0.379	0.381
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the probability of all selective killings averaged over the electoral term. All columns use the RD specification described in Eq. (1)), and include interactions between the normalized population terms and the proxies for past exposure to conflict-related violence and armed conflict. All columns report the coefficient on the interaction term between the dummy for a bigger council and and the respective proxy for past exposure. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. All columns include fixed effects for year, electoral period, population threshold and department, as well as controls for surface area, distance to the both Bogota and the capital of the department, average homicide rate and average presence of violent actions by any group, both over the period between 1988 and the year of the election. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%

Table XXXVI: Effect of paramilitary-linked party in council on selective killings

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A						
Bigger council size	0.010	0.020	-0.015	0.035	-0.010	-0.011
	(0.049)	(0.081)	(0.035)	(0.052)	(0.020)	(0.038)
Bigger council size × has paramilitary-linked	-0.131**	-0.161*	-0.038	-0.149**	-0.035	-0.074
	(0.060)	(0.096)	(0.043)	(0.064)	(0.027)	(0.050)
R-squared	0.186	0.187	0.171	0.176	0.160	0.162
Observations	2772	2772	5528	5528	8724	8724
Panel B						
Bigger council size	0.010	0.020	-0.015	0.035	-0.010	-0.011
	(0.050)	(0.084)	(0.035)	(0.053)	(0.020)	(0.039)
Bigger council size × has paramilitary-linked	-0.131**	-0.161	-0.038	-0.149**	-0.035	-0.074
	(0.062)	(0.099)	(0.044)	(0.065)	(0.027)	(0.051)
R-squared	0.328	0.329	0.303	0.311	0.286	0.290
Observations	693	693	1382	1382	2181	2181
Panel C						
Bigger council size	0.019	-0.001	-0.022	0.031	-0.014	-0.017
	(0.053)	(0.088)	(0.036)	(0.055)	(0.021)	(0.040)
Bigger council size × has paramilitary-linked	-0.121*	-0.124	-0.023	-0.124*	-0.025	-0.054
	(0.064)	(0.102)	(0.043)	(0.064)	(0.026)	(0.050)
R-squared	0.471	0.472	0.444	0.456	0.420	0.425
Observations	231	231	465	465	729	729
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the yearly average probability of all selective killings. All columns use the RD specification described in Eq. (1)), and include interactions between the normalized population terms and the dummy for a mayor from a paramilitary-linked party. All columns report the coefficient on the interaction term between the dummy for a bigger council and the dummy for a mayor from a paramilitary-linked party. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 15 percentage point. All columns include fixed effects for year, electoral period, population threshold and department, as well as controls for surface area, distance to the both Bogota and the capital of the department, average homicide rate and average presence of violent actions by any group, both over the period between 1988 and the year of the election. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%

Table XXXVII: Effect of council size on mayor's party

	h=0.05		h=0.10		h=0.15		h: I-K
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Mayor from paramilitary linked	0.022	-0.024	0.029	-0.029	0.048	-0.007	0.049
	(0.076)	(0.103)	(0.059)	(0.081)	(0.052)	(0.069)	(0.060)
R-squared	0.253	0.255	0.223	0.241	0.145	0.155	0.139
Observations	222	222	443	443	678	678	1038
Mayor from left-wing	-0.046	-0.104	0.018	-0.054	0.011	0.008	0.007
	(0.066)	(0.115)	(0.042)	(0.070)	(0.030)	(0.050)	(0.033)
R-squared	0.143	0.155	0.061	0.073	0.040	0.041	0.064
Observations	222	222	443	443	678	678	1237
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	quadratic

Notes: The bandwidth in Columns (1)-(2) is 5 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 10 percent point, and in Columns (5)-(6) is 15 percentage point. The bandwidth in Column (7) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Imbes-Kalynaram as implemented in state rdob.ado. All columns include fixed effects for year, population threshold and department. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

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Table XXXVIII: Effect of mayor's party: close elections - average over term

	h=0.20		h=0.30		h=0.40	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: bandwidth for margin of victory 0.20						
Big council	0.026	0.160	0.018	0.026	0.043	0.020
	(0.073)	(0.206)	(0.052)	(0.142)	(0.042)	(0.116)
Big council × mayor from paramilitary	-0.099	-0.360	-0.065	-0.257	-0.015	-0.211
	(0.100)	(0.301)	(0.076)	(0.203)	(0.070)	(0.165)
R-squared	0.514	0.565	0.445	0.485	0.496	0.541
Observations	199	199	281	281	320	320
Panel B: bandwidth for margin of victory 0.30						
Big council	0.003	0.118	0.002	0.015	0.029	-0.010
	(0.056)	(0.158)	(0.041)	(0.115)	(0.035)	(0.096)
Big council × mayor from paramilitary	-0.059	-0.272	-0.017	-0.133	-0.001	-0.155
	(0.082)	(0.204)	(0.067)	(0.163)	(0.063)	(0.137)
R-squared	0.492	0.534	0.396	0.438	0.461	0.501
Observations	229	229	325	325	368	368
Panel C: bandwidth for margin of victory 0.40						
Big council	-0.000	0.111	0.007	0.038	0.032	0.001
	(0.048)	(0.135)	(0.034)	(0.099)	(0.032)	(0.088)
Big council × mayor from paramilitary	-0.049	-0.349*	-0.008	-0.152	-0.010	-0.148
	(0.072)	(0.190)	(0.060)	(0.145)	(0.058)	(0.125)
R-squared	0.495	0.538	0.398	0.436	0.462	0.497
Observations	243	243	342	342	386	386
polynomial	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic	linear	quadratic

Notes: The dependent variable is the probability of all selective killings averaged over the electoral term. All columns use the RD specification described in Eq. (1)), and include interactions between the normalized population terms and the dummy for a mayor from a paramilitary-linked party. All columns report the coefficient on the interaction term between the dummy for a bigger council and the dummy for a mayor from a paramilitary-linked party. The bandwidth h (the width of the window of observations used for the regression) in Columns (1)-(2) is 20 percent point, in Columns (3)- (4) is 30 percent point, and in Columns (5)- (6) is 40 percentage point. All columns include fixed effects for year, electoral period, population threshold and department, as well as controls for surface area, distance to the both Bogota and the capital of the department, average homicide rate and average presence of violent actions by any group, both over the period between 1988 and the year of the election. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%

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